THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815. 173 



Piussians had, when we recollect that, at one o'clock, Napoleon had 

 to detach two divisions of cavalry ; then, somewhat later, two in- 

 fantry divisions — in all, over ten thousand men ; that he had to 

 follow these by tlie Young Guard, and by pai-t of the Old Guard ; 

 and that he was really fighting two battles at once. 



The strength of the Prussian army actually engaged at Waterloo 

 alone was over 51,000 men.* Their loss there was 6,998, while at 

 Wavre they lost in addition 2,476, in all 9,474 men. The British 

 loss projjer was 6,936. That of the King's German Legion and other 

 Gei-nian ti-oops under Wellington's command was 4,494. The Dutch- 

 Belgians lost 4,147, of which 1,627 were "missing." Exclusive of 

 the Dutch-Belgians, Wellington's total loss was 11,430. These 

 figures shew that the Prussians must have done as severe fighting 

 as the British, and prove they did not come on the field merely to 

 witness an English victory. If Napoleon had had his whole army, 

 and, what is moi'e, his undivided attention to bestow upon Wel- 

 lington, it is difficult to believe that he would not have been success- 

 ful. Even as it was, with a large part of his force detached to one 

 flank, and with his attention continually distracted to that flank, he 

 captured one position. La Haye Sainte, he almost annihilated Wel- 

 lington's cavalry and decimated his infantry. He drove the Dutch- 

 Belgian contingent clear off the field. But he could not shake the 

 British squares. Once more steadiness was more than a match for 

 dash. 



Had Grouchy obeyed the dictates of common sense and good 

 judgment, lie would probably have secured for Napoleon the oppoi'- 

 tunity of dealing with Wellington single-handed. He failed to do 

 so, although it seems to us he might and ought to have done so. 

 The result was that by eight o'clock in the evening Napoleon was 

 overmastered, his army was in flight. The glories of the Republic, 

 of the Consulate, of the Empire were for a time effaced by so crushing 

 a disaster. Histoiy however will be more just than contemporary 

 depreciation. The candid student will perceive that Napoleon was 

 worthy of his reputation. His general pian of operations was capable 

 of accomplishment, and its defeat is attributable pi'imarily to the 

 useless countermai'ch of D'Erlon, then to the delay in following up 



* By half-past four o'clock, 15,9(iti men and 64 guns. 

 By six o'clock, 29,244 men and G4 guns. 

 By seven o'clock, .')1,944 men and 104 guns. — Siborne, 



