36J ANNUAL REGISTER, 1813. 



On tlic opening of the campaign 

 in that country, our situation be- 

 came totally different from what it 

 had been at any time before, since 

 the commencement of the war. 

 Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos were 

 reduced, and these advantages were 

 accompanied with an extraordinary 

 failure in the means, and relaxa- 

 tion in the efforts of the French. 

 Nothing could be more contemp- 

 tible than the central government 

 of Joseph ; and in the army, there 

 was no mutual assistance or co- 

 operation between the commanders 

 of the north and the south. The 

 British system, therefore, should 

 have been, to have had a force able 

 to maintain active operations in the 

 field, and another competent to 

 keep in check the main body of 

 the French army. The important 

 crisis was now come, in which the 

 grand effort was to be made for 

 the redemption of Spain. A com- 

 parison of the exertions made, with 

 the nature of the crisis, was the 

 next point to which the marquis 

 would direct their lordships' at- 

 tention; and it would be his en- 

 deavour to siiow, that in every in- 

 stance in which the campaign had 

 failed, and the expectations from 

 success been frustrated, it was ow- 

 ing to the insufficiency of the 

 means afforded to the general. He 

 had abstained from holding any 

 correspondence with his noble re- 

 lation on the subject, and professed 

 to know nothing but what the rest 

 of the public know. He began 

 with the sequel if the reduction of 

 Badajos, when it might have been 

 expected that lord Wellington 

 would have seized the French de- 

 pots at Seville, and destroyed the 

 main foundation of their power in 

 that part of Spain, and perhaps 



have found an advantageous oppor- 

 tunity of bringing Soult to action ; 

 but he was under the necessity of 

 marching northwards, in order to 

 meet Marmont, and protect the 

 fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad 

 Rodrigo. If at this time there had 

 been a sufficient force to keep in 

 check the army of Marmont, as sir 

 R. Hill had before done that of 

 Soult, this necessity would have 

 been prevented. Here then was a 

 case in which a small addition of 

 men and resources would have ob- 

 viated the loss of a most favourable 

 opportunity. 



The Marquis then proceeded to 

 the next stage, when the British 

 general was called to the north. 

 After victualling Ciudad Rodrigo, 

 which operation required the whole 

 force of his army, he advanced to 

 Salamanca, where he was again 

 encountered with inefficiency of 

 means. He was opposed by Mar- 

 mont, who had been joined by 

 Bonnet, and he had heard nothing 

 of the Sicilian expedition, on the 

 co-operation of which he mainly 

 relied. He found it necessary to 

 retreat — not a feigned movement 

 to deceive the enemy, but a plain 

 and real retreat. During this ope- 

 ration, an accidental opportunity 

 enabled him to attack tiie enemy 

 at an advantage, and convert re- 

 treat into victory ; but he could 

 not convert a system of retreat to a 

 system of advance; and instead of 

 being at liberty to pursue the van- 

 quished enemy, he was obliged to 

 turn his attention to the corps of 

 Joseph, reinforced from the army 

 of Suchet. He entered Madrid, 

 and if he had possessed the means 

 of keeping Marmont in check, he 

 might have pursued Joseph, and 

 united with the English army at 



