12S] 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1813. 



Hungary. On the other side, Ba- 

 varia took the alarm, and levied 

 additional foices, besides placing 

 its fortresses in the best condition. 

 At length the armistice termi- 

 nated without having produced 

 the effect of opening a road to 

 peace ; and Barclay de Tolly, now 

 commander-in-chief of the allied 

 army, announced from his head- 

 quarters at Reichenbach to the 

 French general, the prince of Neuf- 

 chatel, the re-commencement of 

 hostilities on August 17th. On 

 the 11th count Metternich deli- 

 vered to the count de Narbonne 

 at Prague, a declaration of war by 

 Austria against France. This im- 

 portant document, styled a mani- 

 festo, began with adverting to the 

 part which Austria had been com- 

 pelled to take in the wars that for 

 twentyyears pasthad desolated Eu- 

 rope, during which his imperial 

 majesty's only object had been, self- 

 preservation, and the maintenance 

 of the social system, without any 

 views of conquest or aggrandize- 

 ment. He then took nolice of the 

 cession of his provinces on the 

 Adriatic, which was the i-esult of 

 the war of 1809, and which would 

 have been a still more sensible 

 blow, had not at the same time 

 the whole continent been closed 

 by a general destructive system 

 prohibiting all commercial inter- 

 course. Convinced of the impos- 

 sibility in the existing state of Eu- 

 rope of any improvement in its 

 political condition from the exer- 

 tions of individual powers, and 

 that a peace of some continuance 

 was necessary for the restoration 

 of his own and the neighbouring 

 states, he made a sacrifice of what 

 was dearest to his heart, and " ex- 

 alted above all common scruples," 



consented to an alliance which 

 might incline the stronger and 

 victorious party to a course of 

 moderation and justice ; an effect 

 which he had the more reason to 

 expect, as at that time the emperor 

 Napoleon had attained that point 

 at which the preservation of his 

 conquests was a more natural ob- 

 ject than a struggle after new 

 possessions. In 1810, however, 

 he resolved to unite a considera- 

 ble portion of the north of Ger- 

 many, with the free cities of Ham- 

 burg, Bremen, and Lubeck, to the 

 mass of the French empire, with- 

 out any other pretext than that 

 the war with England required it. 

 The manifesto proceeds to make a 

 number of observations on the ef- 

 fects of this usurpation, particularly 

 on the alarm it might justly excite 

 in Prussia and Russia, and consi- 

 ders it decisive of a future rupture 

 between Russia and France. It 

 then touches, in the way of apo- 

 logy, upon the part Austria had 

 been obliged to take in the war 

 with Russia, and on the events of 

 that war. Its result was a confe- 

 deracy which presented a point of 

 union to the neighbouring states; 

 and in all parts of Germany the 

 desires of the people anticipated 

 the proceedings of their govern- 

 ments. The Austrian cabinet, as 

 far back as December, took steps 

 to dispose the French emperor to 

 peaceful policy, but to all its ad- 

 vances the answer was, that he 

 would listen to no proposals of 

 peace that should violate the in- 

 tegrity of the French empire, in 

 the French sense of the word. This 

 was the more mortifying to Austria, 

 as it placed her invitations to peace, 

 made with the consent of France, 

 to other courts, in a false and dis- 



