APPENDIX TO CHRONICLE. 



1S3 



My British and German troops 

 amounted only to 4,500. Perhaps 

 your lordship may be of opinion, 

 that under these circumstances, I 

 ought to have risked an action, had 

 no other unfavourable objections 

 existed ; but when your lordship is 

 informed, tiiat I had no possibility 

 of retreat if unsuccessful, — that 

 there would have been no hopes of 

 embarkation if followed, — and that 

 the army must have been unavoid- 

 ably lost, if beat,— I venture to 

 hope that your lordship will think, 

 however much it is to be regretted, 

 that I have adopted the only means 

 of maintaining entire, or indeed of 

 saving, an army on which so much 

 depends. I feel the greater confi- 

 dence in this hope, on reverting to 

 the 13th paragraph of your lord- 

 ship's general instructions for the 

 conduct of the campaign. 



I am fully aware there are many 

 circumstances which may require 

 further information, and upon all 

 parts I shall be happy to give every 

 explanation in my power. Your 

 lordship perhaps may be of opinion 

 that the place should have been 

 taken ; but as it was far too strong 

 to storm, I believe it not only to 

 have been impossible, but that we 

 should not have takenit in eight or 

 ten days : my only regret is, that I 

 continued the siege so long. In- 

 duced by the hopes of the rein- 

 forcements I expected, I continued 

 it to the last moment, and fortu- 

 nately the weather proving favour- 

 able, the troops were embarked 

 without molestation. On this fa- 

 vourable circumstance I could not 

 depend for another day, and there- 

 fore, having taken my part, 1 im- 

 mediately put it in execution, and 

 I regret to say, that I was in con- 

 sequence, obliged to ler.vc the guns 



in the most advanced batteries. 

 Had I remained another day, they 

 might have been brought off; but 

 this risk I would not run, when 

 the existence of the army was at 

 stake, not only from unfavourable 

 weather, but from the appearance 

 of an enemy, in whose presence I 

 could not have embarkedperhapsat 

 all, certainly not wilhout suffering 

 a great loss, and without the possi- 

 bility of deriving any advantage. 



I have only further at this time 

 to add, should blame be attach- 

 ed to the failure of the expedition, 

 no share of it can fall on admiral 

 Hallowell, who conducted the 

 naval branch of it. From that dis- 

 tinguished officer I have met with 

 every assistance and co-operation 

 in his ; ower ; and I think- it only 

 justice to him to state, that it was 

 his opinion that the cannon in the 

 batteries might have been saved by 

 remaining till the night, and that 

 they then could have been brought 

 off. This, however, was a risk I 

 did not wish tu run for so trifling 

 an object, and preferred losing 

 them to the chance of the embar- 

 kation being opposed, and of an 

 eventual much more serious loss. 

 I have the honour to be, &c. 

 (Signed) J. iVIuRRAY, 



Lieut.-General. 

 To the Marquis of Wellington, 



K. G. &c. 



COLONIAL DEPARTMENT. 



Dotuning-streei, Juh/ 29. 

 A dispatch, of which the follow- 

 ing is a copy, has been received 

 from lieut.-general sir G. Prevost, 

 by earl Bathurst, one of his ma- 

 jesty's principal secretaries of 

 state :— 



