426 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1813. 



cording to his own declarations, 

 would have permitted, was by 

 every sound maxim of policy wholly 

 inadmissible, and would at last 

 have proved only a vain endeavour 

 to shrink from the approaching 

 trial. A power so important as 

 Austria could not renounce all par- 

 ticipation in the interests of Europe, 

 nor could she place herself in a 

 situation in which, equally ineffec- 

 tive in peace or war, she would 

 lose her voice and influence in all 

 great negociations, without acquir- 

 ing any guarantee for the security 

 of her own frontier. To prepare 

 for war against France would have 

 been, under the existing circum- 

 stances, as little consonant with 

 equity as with prudence. The 

 emperor Napoleon had given his 

 majesty no personal ground for 

 hostile proceedings ; and the pros- 

 pect of attaining many beneficial 

 results by a skilful employment of 

 the established friendly relations, 

 by confidential representations, and 

 by conciliatory counsels, had not 

 yet been abandoned as hopeless. 

 And with regard to the immediate 

 interest of the state, such a revolu- 

 tion would inevitably have been 

 attended with this consequence — 

 that the Austrian territory would 

 have become the first and principal 

 seat of war, which, with its well- 

 known deficiency of means of de- 

 fence, would, in a short time, have 

 ^overthrown the monarchy. 

 . In this painful situation his ma- 

 jesty had no other resource than to 

 take the field on the side of France. 

 To take up arms for France, in the 

 real sense of the word, would have 

 been a measure not only in contra- 

 diction with the duties and prin- 

 ciples of the emperor, but even 

 with the repeated declarations of 



his cabinet, which had, without 

 any reserve, disapproved of this 

 war. On the signature of the treaty 

 of the 12th of March, 1812, his 

 majesty proceeded upon two dis- 

 tinct principles : the first, as is 

 proved by the words of the treaty, 

 was, to leave no means untried 

 which might sooner or later obtain 

 a peace; the other was, to place 

 himself internally and externally in 

 a position, which, if it should prove 

 impossible to effect a peace, or in 

 case the turn of the war should 

 render decisive measures in this 

 part necessary, would enable Aus- 

 tria to act with independence, and 

 in either of these cases to adopt 

 the measures which a just and 

 wise policy should prescribe. Upon 

 this principle it was, that only a 

 fixed and comparatively small part 

 of the army was destined to co- 

 operate in the war; the other mili- 

 tary resources, at that time in a 

 state of readiness, or that still re- 

 mained to be prepared, were not 

 called for the prosecution of this 

 war. By a kind of tacit agree- 

 ment between the belligerents, the 

 Austrian territory was even treated 

 as neutral. The real end and views 

 of the system adopted by his ma- 

 jesty, could not escape the notice 

 of France, Russia, or any intelli- 

 gent observer. 



The campaign of 1812 furnished 

 a memorable example of the failure 

 of an undertaking supported by 

 gigantic powers, conducted by a 

 captain of the first rank, when, in 

 the confidence of great military 

 talents, he despises the rules of 

 prudence, and outsteps the bounds 

 of nature. The illusion of glory 

 carried the emperor Napoleon 

 into the heart of the Russian Em- 

 pire ; and a ftilse political view of 



