HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



131 



could be launched in time to replace 

 the casualties or occasional exi- 

 gencies of the service. 



That hostilities had been foreseen 

 and decided upon, long before par- 

 liament or the country were so ap- 

 prized, may fairly be supposed ; yet 

 were not the naval preparations, as 

 we have shewn, calculated for such 

 an event, nor our measures such, as 

 to impress the eueaiy with awe, or 

 even respect, for our means of hos- 

 tility. In the militarjr branch of 

 the naval department, the greatest 

 deficiency, both in measures of pre- 

 caution, as well as of oflence, were 

 observable. The different convoys 

 were unprotected, even at the mo- 

 ment the admiralty were stating to 

 parliament the security which the 

 merchants derived from their exer- 

 tious, and they were sent to their 

 respective destinations,' under the 

 protection of vessels utterly in- 

 competent to the service. Among 

 many other proofs of this fact, may 

 be adduced that of the Newfound- 

 land fleet, which was taken, and 

 the vessel of war (the Wolverene, 

 of eight guns) sent as an escort, was 

 actually sunk by the paltry priva- 

 teer by which it was captured. 



A far more serious disaster oc- 

 curred, in the non-apprizal of admi- 

 ral Rainier (who commanded the 

 British fleets in the East-Indies) of 

 the certainty, or, at least, the pro- 

 bability, of a war with France, 

 whilst that event was in contein])la- 

 tion, by an overland dispatch. From 

 this fatal neglect, t'he French admi- 

 ral, l.inois, not only made his es- 

 cape from the very anchorage which 

 the Enslishsquadron occupied before 

 Foudicherry, but was enabled to cap- 

 ture, uumolestcd, not only many of 



our most valuable India ships,butaIso 

 to plunder the settlement at Bencoo- 

 len* ! In fine, our trade, in every 

 part of the world, suffered much 

 more than in any former period of 

 war; and the incapacity of the ad- 

 miralty, either to protect it, or an- 

 noy that of the enemy, became uni- 

 versally apparent. 



As it was to the success of a naval 

 war (th.it trusty and well-tried spe- 

 cies of defence, which had so often 

 rescued Britain from the greatest 

 difficulties, and poured dismay and 

 confusion upon her enemies^ that 

 the country looked with confident 

 eagerness, so Mas their disappoint- 

 ment bitter in the extreme, wiien it 

 became but too apparent, that little 

 chance existed of adding to the na- 

 tional glory, or even of protecting 

 ourselves, were the naval administra- 

 tion of the country entrusted to 

 such incompetent hands as those, in 

 whose direction it was now placed. 

 It was found, that, at the awful cri- 

 sis of a renewed Avar with France, 

 who had, by force of arms, or insi- 

 dious negociation, enslaved or terri- 

 fied half Europe into subjection to her 

 views : that, to combat this hitherto 

 unconquered power, we had an ex- 

 hausted, unrepaired, andill-equJpped 

 fleet, and, worst of all, a system of 

 naval management which foi Lad any 

 hope of amendment or amelioration. 

 Nor was the evil confined to naval 

 equipment alone — it pervaded the 

 whole of the service. The harsh 

 and tyrannical measures of the ad- 

 miralty, from which they never de- 

 viated, were imitated and adopted 

 by many officers, in the interior re- 

 gulations of their ships : and the 

 privations which the sailors endured, 

 in consequence thereof, Induced 



* Fort Alarlbwouah. 

 K2 " 



several 



