134 ANNUAL REGIStER, 1804. 



been broken up and sold for little 

 or nothing at the peace of Amiens) 

 would, in all human probability, have 

 prevented the junction of the ene- 

 my's flotilla at Boulogne, and in every 

 event have placed the possibility of 

 invasion, according to the plan at 

 present adopted by France, at a 

 period far more remote. 



Tims, after reprobating a species 

 of defence as inefficient and expen. 

 sive, did the admiralty rush into 

 the opposite extreme, and, until 

 the change of government drove 

 them from office, did they hire, 

 build, and fit out an armament of 

 the rery description they had so 

 much and so long neglected : and 

 thus have subjected themselves, in 

 whatever light they can be consi- 

 dered, as the most weak and inde- 

 cided, or the most remiss and cnl- 

 pable naval administration Britain 

 has ever witnessed. 



The want of decision and energy 

 in the councils of the British empire, 

 at the commencement of the present 

 year, had produced a considerable 

 degree of torpor and despondency 

 in the public mind. On the part of 

 England, the war with France had 

 assumed no decisive character ; and 

 its immense resources seemed entirely 

 absorbed in providing means of de- 

 fence against the threatened inva- 

 sion. On the capture of a few ill- 

 defended French and Dutch West 

 India settlements, it appeared as if 

 the energies of the country could 

 go no farther, or make the slightest 

 attempt to shake or produce any im- 

 pression upon the vast mass of ter- 

 ritory and power acquired by her 



ambitious and encroaching rival 



While, on the contrary, the ruler 

 of the French, although he appear- 

 ed unceasingly engaged in securing 

 advantages in Italy and Germany, 



much more than equivalent to any 

 which England could gain in colo- 

 nial warfare, yet pursued with un- 

 remitting exertion the equipment of 

 his armament at Boulogne, which 

 at once menaced the country with 

 invasion, and obliged us to confine 

 within ourown islands, for home de- 

 fence, a considerable portion of that 

 army which might otherwise have 

 been tmployed in foreign service. It 

 was in vain that the British govern, 

 mcnt attempted to raise the hopes 

 of the nation at home, or gain respect 

 abfoad, by suggesting the proba- 

 bility of coalitions being formed on 

 the continent against France. Un- 

 fortunately, however, for such views, 

 the grounds which Mr. Addington's 

 administration had assumed on com- 

 mencing hostilities, were fatal to 

 any rational hope of continental 

 co-operation. The objects which 

 Avcre known to govern Great Bri- 

 tain on that measure, were such as 

 totally disconnected her interests 

 from those of the other EuroptaM 

 powers. In the king's declaration, 

 indeed, some stress bad been laid 

 upon the usurpations of Bonaparte, 

 and his attacks upon the liberties of 

 other nations, but a long period of 

 acquiescence to those arbitrary mea- 

 sures, had sufficiently proved that they 

 would still have been submitted to, if 

 France had consented to have left 

 ]Malta in the possession of England. 

 To Austria and Prussia it was in- 

 deed, matter of indifference in whose 

 hands that island remained ; but 

 with Russia the case was different : 

 that power had views of her own 

 upon Malta, and certainly could 

 not but see with displeasure, the 

 determination of Great Britain on 

 its retention. It, therefore, was 

 not matter of surprise, that we 

 should have begun the war, and 



hitherto 



