210 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1804. 



connexion between a powerful na- 

 tive state, and an army such as wc 

 have described, totally under French 

 government and influence, must al- 

 ways have proved to the British in- 

 terests, a danger far more urgent 

 arose out of this powerful military 

 establishment, from its reduction of 

 Scindiah's local authority in Ilindos- 

 tan. A considerable portion of ter- 

 ritory belonging to thrJ; chieftain, 

 situated between the Jumna, Gan- 

 ges, and the mountains of Cumaon, 

 had been assigned by him to general 

 Perron, who had formed it into an 

 independent state, of which his re- 

 gular infantry might be considered 

 the national army. The natives con- 

 sidered INI. Perron as their immedi- 

 ate sovereign, while the troops con- 

 sidered him the direct executive 

 authority from whom they were 

 to receive orders, subsistence, and 

 pay. Possessed of such means, it 

 is not to be wondered at, that he 

 dictated as a sovereign to the lesser 

 princes on the right bank of the 

 Jumna, held in abjedt submission 

 the Rajahpoot states of Jeynagur 

 and Judpore, together with the 

 Jauts and the Gohud, and extended 

 his influence even to Bundelcund, 

 and the country of the Seiks. 



Here then was a French state ac- 

 tually formed, and, which, it must 

 be recollected, held possession of 

 the person and the nominal autho- 

 rity of the mogul, maintained the 

 most efficient army existing in India, 

 with the exception of the English 

 troops, and exercised considerable 

 influence from the Indus to the con- 

 fluence of the Jumna and the Gan- 

 ges. In every point of view, there- 



fore, in which this establishment 

 could be considered, either as the 

 instrument toScindiah, in his hostile 

 designs on the British power, or as 

 the means by which the vindictive 

 ruler of the French nation might 

 hereafter inflict the most deadly 

 wound on the British empire in 

 Asia, it imperiously called for re- 

 duction or total suppression. 



That M. Perron's views and prac- 

 tice Avere connected with, and re- 

 gulated by those of his native go- 

 vernment, there can be no doubt. 

 Well aware of the great superiority 

 of the British power, he knew that 

 it was alone by such an establish- 

 ment as he had formed, that France 

 could ever regain her footing in the 

 cast. To mature and perfect his 

 projects, it was most necessary to 

 him to strengthen and complete hia 

 tarmy, by the annual supply of 

 French subaltern officers and artil- 

 lerists. The settlement of Pondi- 

 chcrry was of the greatest conse- 

 cjiience to this object. During the 

 prevalence of the south-western 



monsoons, the common 



coasting- 



vessels of the country could thence 

 convey recruits to the coast of Cuf- 

 tack, in four days, without excit- 

 ing the suspicion of the British 

 cruizers. From Cuttack, belong- 

 ing to Bhoonsla, the ally of Scin-. 

 dia, the transit was safe and secret 

 to M. Perron's head-quarters in the 

 Douab. These views and circnm- 

 stances were communicated by that 

 officer to the first consul, about the 

 period of the ratification of the 

 treaty of Amiens. 



Among the many extraordinary 

 and novel feature's whicli that un- 

 fortunate 



He was succeeded in his command by M. Perron, a Frenchman, who had come out 

 to India a midsliipman in IM. de SullVein's fleer, and who commanded one of the 

 battalions under de Boigne for many years. The latter now resides ia Paris. 



