HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



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were encamped at about six miles 

 distance from the ground which 

 general Wellesley intended to oc- 

 cupy. 



With that decision and prompti- 

 tude, which have ever distinguished 

 general Welicsley's military ex- 

 ploits, he immediately determined 

 upon attacking the enemy, without 

 waiting for the junction of colonel 

 Stevenson's corps on the following 

 morning. Had he a6ted otherwise, 

 the confederate chieftains, in pur- 

 suance of the defensive system they 

 had adopted, would probably have 

 withdrawn their guns and infantry 

 in the course of the night of the 

 23d, and thus have eluded a general 

 aftion, which was so much to be 

 desired. The measure of attack, 

 therefore, was directed by prudence 

 as well as courage. 



Having provided for the security 

 of the baggage and stores, general 

 Welleslev moved on towards the 

 army of the confederates, which he 

 found encamped between, and along 

 the course of the two rivers Kaitna 

 and Juab, towards their jun6tion. 

 Their line extended east and west 

 along the north bank of the Kaitna, 

 which was steep and rocky, and 

 impassable for guns, excepting close 

 to the villages. Their right, entirely 

 of cavalry, was posted near Boker- 

 dun, and extended quite to their 

 in%nfry, encamped in the neigh- 

 bojirhood ot the fortified village of 

 Assye. The British army had 

 inarched 14 miles to Naiilnair, 

 thence to the enemy's camp was six ; 

 thus it was one o'clock in the 

 afternoon before it came in view of 

 the combined army of the confede- 

 rates. 



Although general Wellesley's line 

 of march brought him in front of 

 the right of the enemy, he deter- 



mined on attacking its left, where 

 the infantry and guns were posted. 

 He, accordingly, moved round to 

 the left flank, covering the British 

 column of infantry by the British 

 cavalry in the rear, and by the My- 

 sore and the peishwa's horse on the 

 right flank. / 



The British army crossed the Kait- 

 na, at a ford beyond the enemy's 

 left, and were immediately formed 

 in two lines of infantry, with the 

 British cavalry as a reserve in a 

 third, in an open space between 

 theKaitna and the Juah, where these 

 rivers run nearly parallel. Tha 

 peishwa's and the Mysore cavalry 

 were stationed to the southward of 

 the Kaitna, on the left flank of the 

 British troops, and kept in check a 

 large body of cavalry which had 

 followed, though at a respectful 

 distance, general Wellesley's route 

 from the right of their own posi- 

 tion. The tirst line consisted of the 

 advanced pickets to the right, two 

 battalions of Sepoys, and the 78th 

 regiment ; — the second, of the 74th 

 regiment and two battalions of Se- 

 poys; — and the third, of the l3th 

 dragoons, with three regiments of 

 native cavalry, the whole amount- 

 ing to about 4500 men. From the 

 most accurate calculation that could 

 be made, the enemy consisted of 

 between thirty and forty thousand, 

 of which a third was commanded 

 by European officers,) and a traia 

 of more than one hundred pieces of 

 ordnance. Under this vast dispro- 

 portion of force, the engagement 

 began. 



When the enemy discovered the 

 intention of attacking him on the 

 left, he changed the position of his 

 infantry and guns, from the line 

 along the Kaitna, and extended it 

 from that river across to the villaga 



of 



