26 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1805. 



sense of the party \ras the only 

 thing that could decide as to the 

 justice or injustice. The treaty of 

 St. Ildefonso left no right of exami- 

 nation or enquiry. It was therefore 

 an offensive treaty, which, if not re- 

 nounced, furnishes this country with 

 a sufficient ground for war. Spain 

 did not think herself bound to ad- 

 here strictly to that treaty, but she 

 vas bound to fulfil the condition on 

 ■which she obtained a stipulated for- 

 bearance on the part of this coun- 

 try ; in having failed to do so, war, 

 of course, followed as the incyitable 

 consequence. 



Mr. Fox considered it to be a 

 monstrous' doctrine, and nothing 

 better than a gross fraud, to main- 

 tain that we could be justified in en- 

 tering, into an implied agreement 

 •with another power, by which tliat 

 power conceived itself safe from at- 

 tack, merely for the purpose of 

 commencin<; hostilities at the mo- 

 ment when they were least expect- 

 ed, or that ve had a right to put an 

 end to neutrality, just at the period 

 when we could take advantage of 

 the power with which that neutrality 

 existed. He admitted that when 

 hostilities commenced between this 

 country and France, we had a right 

 to compel Spain to renounce the 

 treaty of St. Ildefonso, or to declare 

 •war pgainst her; but it was at the 

 same time worthy of an cnliglitoncd 

 policy, to try if some arrangement 

 could not be made, by which such 

 extremities might have been pre- 

 Tcnted. In this respect he accused 

 ministers of requiring frankness and 

 implicit explanation on the part of 

 Spain, whereas, on their own part, 

 all was reserve, neglect, and diffi- 

 dence. Five months, during which 

 French intrigue v.as known to b,e 

 most active, were suffered to elapse 



without any instructions whaterer 

 to our minister at the court of Ma- 

 drid, and during •which, the whole 

 matter was left entirely to chance. 

 Our ministers knew, formonths, that 

 a subsidiary treaty was negociating 

 between France and Spain, and did 

 not use one effort to prevent it. 

 Spain had every reason to think that 

 the commutation from aid in kind 

 to pecuniary aid, -jvould be most de- 

 sirable to this country, and our mi- 

 nisters never remonstrated against 

 it, or interfered at all : they now ca- 

 lumniated Spain for having made it. 

 As to the amount of the subsidy, it 

 could be no just ground of war, for, 

 in makii;g the arrangement, Spain 

 was necessarily left at the mercy of 

 France, and the issue a?ose out of 

 her dependent situation. The ar- 

 mament could only have been used by 

 this country for a pretence, and the 

 more so, as it was countermanded 

 after our remonstrance. The at-, 

 tack upon the frigates he consider- 

 ed to be a wanton and premeditated 

 outrage on a neutral flag, and to 

 have Mr. Frere at the same moment 

 negociating at Madrid, was an act 

 of fraud and duplicity unparalleled, 

 unless, perhaps, in some of the 

 cursed precedents already alluded to. 

 The Chancellor of the Exchequer 

 denied that the forbearance used to- 

 wards S]iain was for the purpose of 

 taking the most favourable moment 

 for declaring war. On the contra- 

 ry, the state of the case was precise- 

 ly this : we declared to Spain that 

 we reserved the enormous amount 

 of the subsidj' as a just ground of 

 war, but that, at her request, we 

 were willing to forbear, for a time, 

 as she had still hopes that she would 

 speedily be in a situation to observe 

 a strict neutrality. But when, in- 

 stead of producing this effect, Spain 



refused 



