HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



121 



ceded to, have diminished consider- 

 ably the sum of calarafty, which a 

 more extended warfare must neces- 

 sarily produce. 



The ruler of France. hcrw^ever, to 

 whom no means are repugnant or re- 

 volting, which enable him to for- 

 ward his great object of attaining 

 universal empire, f.iw this equitable 

 and humane OTcrture in no other 

 light than that which best suited his 

 barbarous butnarrovv- vievvs. As it 

 was in theDutch ports, and by the aid 

 of Dutch shipwrights and sailors, 

 that he relied for the construction 

 and manning of the f.otilla he des- 

 tined for the glorious achievement 

 ofinyading and conquering Great 

 Brita n, so he speedily dcterrainod 

 to involve that devoted country, 

 already exhausted, as well by the 

 ho'stility of England as the friend- 

 ship of France, drained of crery re- 

 source, despoiled of her navy, and 

 degraded fro-n her proud rank 

 among the nations of Europe, and 

 expose her anew to all the evils of 

 a contest, in which she must neces- 

 sarily be the greatest sufi'erer. The 

 proposition, therefore, with re- 

 spect to Holland, was peremptorily 

 rejected. 



The relative situation of France 

 and Spain was, however, widely dif- 

 ferent. Spain had still in her domi- 

 nion a great many valuable colo- 

 nies, which a v/ar might endanger. 

 — -Her chance of conquests was as 

 nothing in the scale. — Her anriies 

 could not be madi; available to the 

 purposes of Bonaparte, who had al- 

 ready as many soldiers on foot as 

 he could pay, or could be employed 

 in a war with Crrcat Britain alone. 

 In (his uiew of tilings, tlieriTore, the 

 oiperor of the French seemed wil- 

 'iut; to allow Spain to preserve her 

 neutrality, re^ervin^ to himself the 



right, under the specious conditions 

 of treaty and alliance, to pillage her 

 of specie at his will and mercy. 



It is little if at all to be doubted, 

 but that Spain, at every period 

 since the French revolution, was 

 sincere in her wishes for neutrality, 

 and thatsheshould beleft to recruit, 

 at her leisure, her exhausted trea- 

 sury, and the restoration of her 

 commerce, at the end of the last war 

 almost totally destroyed. This was 

 now also her first object, — bat the 

 constant appearance of a powerful 

 French army on her frontier, and 

 the menace of her invasion, as con- 

 stantly held out by Bonaparte, had 

 obliged her to furnish the French 

 government with whatever suras of 

 money it demanded. In this view 

 of the relative situation of France 

 afid Spain, it would appear that, for 

 souietirae at least, the British cabi- 

 net considered this mode of supply- 

 ing to the enemy the sinews of war, 

 as an act evidently under the in- 

 lluence of coercion, one therefore of 

 pure necessity, and not in fairness 

 to be considered as a legitimate 

 ground of war. 



Some unpleasant discussions, how- 

 ever, which arose between the Eng- 

 lish amb.issador at the court of Ma- 

 drid, Mr. Frere, and the prince of 

 peace, quickly evinced the disposi- 

 tion of the latter personage, whose 

 power over the Spanish councils was- 

 absolutc, as hostile in the extreme 

 to the interests of frreat Britain, 

 and equally devoted to the views of 

 Bonaparte. 



In the well known French official 

 journal, the Mo7mteur, there had ap- 

 peared an article, in which Mr. Frere 

 was said to have expressed to the 

 prince of peace, " that, in the pre- 

 *' sent state of things, assassination 

 " and murder might lawfully be re- 



" serted 



