12$ 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1805. 



table conduct of the administration 

 throughent the whole of this trans- 

 action. But popular]}' considered, 

 the question generally turned upon 

 the policy and expediency of ths 

 measure. Abstract reasoning and 

 speculative theory are as little to 

 the public taste, as the public are 

 competent to their decision. While 

 some thought it highly unjust, 

 wnwise, and impolitic to force 

 Spain into war, tlicrcby compelling 

 her to become the active ally of 

 France, narrowing considerably the 

 sources of our commerce, ai\d mul- 

 tiplying the points of attack and de- 

 fence, to a degree to wliicli our 

 means of warfare were by no means 

 co-extensive : a great majority ^cem- 

 cd to allow that Great Urifain had 

 abundant cause of provocation, and 

 that an absolute necessity existed lor 

 the attacking Spain. They argued^- 

 that where nations are in the situa- 

 tion of merely defei*red hostilities, 

 nntil rt shall be the interest of one 

 or the other to commence them, 

 and that when the balance of ag. 

 gression inclines neither to^tlje one 

 side or the other, it is of very little 

 ■weight, in the eye of justice or rea- 

 son, which party has given the first 

 blow. They maintained, that (rrcat 

 Britain was alike injured and out- 

 raged by Spain, when the latter 

 power acknowledged, by her own 

 confession, her obligation to furnish 

 France, actually at war with Eng- 

 land, Mith a regular yearly subsidy, 

 to the amount of the contingent 

 stipulated by the treaty of St. lldc- 

 fonso. — But this was not all i the 

 instrument in question, while it de- 

 lin.ed the nature and qvivitum of the 

 assistance so to be furnished in case 

 of war, also added, " that, if it 

 "should be deemed necessary, Spain 



'■ should be bound to assist France 

 with all her forces !" As Bonaparte 

 would, doubtless, be the sole arbiter 

 of this necessity, upon the same 

 principle of commutation, which 

 had been adopted in the case of the 

 annual supply of three millions, he 

 might, whenever he pleased, have 

 called for the whole of her pecunia- 

 ry resources, and apply them direct- 

 ly as his will and pleasure should 

 direct! If then the administration, 

 of wliich Mr. Addingtoa was the 

 head, had been so weak as to admit 

 the principle that it was allowable 

 for other nations to assist and aid 

 the enemies of Great Britain, with 

 all their revenues, provided they did 

 not fit out fleets, it could not be 

 supposed that any succeeding go- 

 vernment should conceive itself 

 bound to aOhcre to a principle so 

 evidently absurd. They asserted, 

 tjiat it was much more to the ad- 

 vantage of France that Spaia 

 should assist hj^*with hff money, 

 than in anf May more active. Did 

 the latter tit out an auxiliary fleet, 

 the chances were that it would be 

 destroyed or captured by the Bri- 

 tish squadions, but there was no 

 possibility of intercepting,' on the 

 road, the treasure remitted from 

 lAladrid to Paris. On the ocean 

 alone could that event take place. 

 And, finally, that if the resources of 

 "L'ipain were not to be attacked, and 

 that she was not to be compelled to 

 undergo the expences attendant oo 

 defensive and otfensive war, her 

 whole m.cans would tie at the dcvo 

 tion of France, a species of aid in 

 finitely more detrimental to the" 

 British interests, than the most 

 vigoious co-operation of her arma- 

 mients with those of France could 

 have furnished. 



Afte 





