184 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1805. 



alike unwise and precipitate. Whe- 

 ther he were goadeil on to action by 

 the advice of the courts of London 

 and St, Pctrrsburgh. or whether his 

 resolves originated in his own cabi- 

 net, we cannot pretend to idecidc ; 

 bnt it is certain that his whole line 

 of conduct was that the best calcu- 

 lated to ensure the triumph of his 

 adversary, and ruin the cause of the 

 allied powers. It is unnecessary to 

 recapitulate the details of the short 

 ■war, begun and ended in less than 

 three months, which our two last 

 chapters have so minutely described : 

 one equally marked by the most 

 rapid and splendid successes on the 

 p4rt of France, on that of Austria 

 and the coalition, by total'discom. 

 fiture and disgrace. In this short 

 period, the emperor Francis saw 

 himself despoiled of by far the 

 greater part of his Iieroditary states, 

 and forced to accept the conditions 

 of peace imposed upon him by his 

 opponent, and dictated on the fron- 

 tiers of Unngary, his last remain- 

 ing possession ! 



But if it even be supposed that 

 the allies of Francis had, by their 

 promises and entreaties, so far 

 jjrevailed upon him as to com- 

 mence operations at an inauspicious 

 moment, wc cannot find the same 

 excuse for his conduct towards Ba- 

 varia, at once imperious, indecisive, 

 and impolitic. Often the rival, and 

 always the enemy of Austria, this 

 stale had been taken under the pe- 

 culiar protection of France, who 

 had, in the aflTair of the indemnities, 

 and upon every other occasion, so 

 acted, as to attach it intimately to 

 the French interests, and aggran- 

 dize it in Germany as much as pos- 

 sible, and, in more than one in- 

 stance, at the expence of Austria. 

 Thus circumstanced^ it was there- 



fore the obvious policy of the Ana- 

 trians cither to respect, and thus 

 perhaps secure, the neutrality of the 

 elector of Bavaria, or if that point 

 were unattainable, then to proceed 

 to such decided measures as would 

 effectually prevent his giving actual 

 assistance to the enemy. In cither 

 case, violent measures in the first 

 instance would be resorted to unwise- 

 ly. At the moment when hostilities 

 were in train to commence, the el- 

 der son of the elector of Bavaria was 

 about tiic jjerson of Bonaparte, a vi- 

 sitor at his court, or, in other words, 

 an hostage for the future conduct of 

 his father. 



It had been the original plan of 

 the campaign, on the part of Aus- 

 tria, to wait the junction of the 

 Russians upon the river Lech, a po- 

 sition uj)on which, however, could 

 not be taken, without traversing 

 nearly the whole of Bavaria. A mosi 

 imperious communication was at 

 this moment made, through Prince 

 Sciiwartzctibursih, to the court of 

 Munich, requiring the elector imme- 

 diately to join his army to that of 

 tltc emperor of Austria. To this 

 ur.qiialitiod demand, it was also re- 

 quired, in addition, that, in the 

 event of such a junction, the Bava- 

 rian army should not be allowed to 

 act separately, but must be incorpo- 

 rated with the Austrian, and even 

 menaces were added, with an un- 

 sparing hand, should this intimation 

 remain uncomplicd with. The elec- 

 tor, thus pressed, endeavoured, in 

 the first instance, to negociate for 

 his neutrality, which he most ear- 

 nestly entreated to be allowed to 

 keep ; but finding it absolutely ne- 

 cessary to give a categorical answer 

 to the A ustrian minister, he at length 

 pntmised the junction of his forces, 

 subject to the conditions of a treaty 



