204 



AN^NUAL HSGISTER, 1805. 



stance, and upon the probable efteiSl 

 •»rhicli that condu6t is calculated to 

 produce upon the minds of the native 

 princes and chieftains in India, as 

 well as upon all the interests of 

 Great Britain, in that qiiarter of the 

 globe. 



The inordinate demands of IIoI- 

 kar extended not only to a violation 

 of the rights and territories of our 

 allies, but to the cessions of large 

 tra6ls of country, which had been in 

 the possession of the nabob of Ourfe 

 for a great rvumber of years, and 

 were by that prince ceded to the 

 Brilish government, in theyear 1801, 

 nnder the conditions of the treaty of 

 Lucknow. — It will also be recoU 

 lefled, that these demands were 

 iirgtd immcdiacly after the close of 

 the last glorious war against the con- 

 federated Mahralta chiefs, Scindiah 

 and the Bcrar r.ijah, and were now 

 attempted to be enforced by a hos- 

 tile and predatory incursion upon 

 the territory of the tirm ally to the 

 British aovernmeut, the rajah of 

 Jeynagliur. 



It was absolutely necessary, there- 

 fore, effcftually to reduce the mis- 

 chievous power of Hoikar, which 

 had been applied to the ruinous pur- 

 pose of impairing the foundations of 

 general tranquillity ; of seducing the 

 faith of our allies ; of alienating the 

 allegiance of our subjects ; and of e- 

 refting, upon the dcstru(5tion of our 

 resources and alliances, a new state 

 in India, composed exclusively of 

 lawless free hooters, adti'fited by in- 

 terests and views, incompatible with 

 the security of any of the establish- 

 ed powers iti India, and urged by 

 desperate necessity, and by an ad- 

 venturous spirit of rapine and plun- 

 der, ta pursue a general system of 

 depredation upon the possession of 

 all ih« coatifioiu staUt! 



The merits of the British goverrt- 

 ment are not less conspicuous in the 

 precautions which it adopted, with a 

 view to the contingency of eventual 

 hostilities with Hoikar, than in the 

 temper and forbearance by which it 

 endeavoured, in its ncgociations 

 with that chieftain, to avert the cai 

 laniities of w ar. 



The necessity of a new arrange- 

 ment with Hoikar was no sooner 

 manifest to the British government, 

 than it immediately adopted such 

 measures as were best calculated td 

 give weight to its just demands, in 

 any negotiation with that chieftaiuj 

 or, in the event of unavoidable hosi 

 tilities, to afford means of bringing 

 the contest to an early and success- 

 ful termination. 



With fi view to these combined 

 objects, the British army, which had 

 recently been employed against tha 

 army of Scifidiah and monsieur Per- 

 ron, in Uindostan, was retainni id 

 the field (under the personal com- 

 mand of the commander in chiefj 

 lord Lake), in the vicinity of the 

 position assumed by Hoikar and hia 

 forces ; and instrutlions were issued 

 to major-general Wellesley, com- 

 manding the British troops in the 

 Deckan, for the purpose of securing, 

 in the event of hostilities with Hoi- 

 kar, the most prompt and effeAual 

 co-operation between that officer 

 and the commander in chief, agairist 

 the forces of the enemy. 



The merits of the military opera- 

 tions against this predatory chieftain 

 cannot be estimated by any refe- 

 rence to the extent of the period 

 during which they continued ; their 

 protracted issue was in no de- 

 gree owing to a want of zeal or ener^ 

 gy, on the part of either the govern- 

 ment or the army ; every praflicable 

 effort was made by the former to fa- 



cilrtafit 



