APPENDIX to the CHRONICLE. 



571 



press of sail had been carried after 

 the action, and afi'ords a specimen 

 of what miglit have been expected, 

 had 1 ordered them to carry so 

 much sail on the morning after the 

 action, as must have been necessary 

 to have gi\\3n me even a chance of 

 getting up to the enemy. 



It has also been proved to you, 

 by captain Inman, tliat when, on 

 the morning of the 23d, I ordered 

 his Ship to drive away a frigate that 

 was coming too near us, for the 

 purpose of reconnoitrio;:, he was 

 every moment apprehensive that her 

 masts would have gone by the 

 board. 

 ; Another consequence, Avhichmust 

 I have attended my attempt to force 

 I a renewal of the action, would have 

 I been a separation, and probable 

 capture of the Windsor-castle and 

 prizes ; for, independently of the 

 I probability of their falling in with 

 I the llochefort squadron, had I sent 

 ' them to England, witliout taking 

 care of them until tJiey were past 

 I that danger, it was observed that 

 I the enemy had three sail of the line 

 and three or four frigates constantly 

 advanced on their wealher-bow, 

 re^,dy to act against any ships that 

 might hitve been separated from the 

 main-body, provided I had made 

 any movemi nt to occasion such se- 

 paration. This I conceive it was 

 my duty, on every account, to pre- 

 vent. IJy doing so, I preserved the 

 victory 1 had acquired, in spite of 

 their very great superiority, and in 

 defiance of the many hostile squa- 

 <irons I was surrounded by at this 

 lime. 



In endeavouring to compel a re- 

 newal of the action, 1 should also 

 have sustained a very considerable 

 inconvenience in the want of fri- 

 :'ites, a class of ships particularly 



useful at such a time, for purposes 

 so obvious to the court, that it 

 would be superfluous to point them 

 out. 



Permit mc also to say a wor^ or 

 two upon the superiority of the 

 enemy in point of numbers. I am 

 far from encouraging the idea, that 

 on no account is an engagement to 

 be risked where the enemy is even 

 greatly superior : I know too well 

 the spirit, tlie valour, and bravery 

 of my countrymen, to en Certain 

 such a thought ; ray conduct iu 

 commencing the action on tliis oc- 

 casion is a decisive proof of it. But 

 I do deprecate the idea, Ihat, under 

 all circumstances, and in all situa- 

 tions, an engagement must be conti- 

 nued as long as it is prarficable to 

 continue it, whatever may be the 

 opinion of the officer comnianuiug a 

 squadron that he p'l^b- to hazard, by 

 such continuance, viv advantages he 

 had gained by his original attack. — 

 The consequence of such an idea 

 being encouraged and inculcated, 

 must one day bea^me fatal to many 

 good and gallant otlicer.-, as well as 

 to my country. I contend that 

 every case of an engagcoit nt with a 

 superior force must depend upon its 

 OM'n circumstances ; and the pro- 

 priety or impropriety of entering 

 into, or renewing it, Tnust depend 

 upon the discretion of the com- 

 mander, to be exercised according 

 to llie best of his judgment, and 

 subject to that responsibility which 

 attaches to all persons in situations 

 of counn.iiid. 



Circumstanced as I thus was, it 

 appeared to nie to be im])raeticdble 

 to have forced tlic encniv (o action, 

 or, if at ail, with such advantage as 

 would have justilied the attempt, 

 even if 1 liad iiad nothing to appre- 

 hend from any squadron but that 



which 



