572 ANNUAL REGISTER, 1805. 



which I was opposed to, and if the 

 opposing squadron had been the 

 only object to which, by my orders, 

 my attention had been directed, but 

 when I reflected that, in addition to 

 that squadron and the Kochefort, 

 which it appears were then actually 

 at sea, there were 16 sail of the line 

 at Fcrrol, within a few hours sail, 

 who, if not already out, might, on 

 receiving intelligence from the com- 

 bined squadrons, have come out to 

 their aKsistance, or, in the event of 

 my not being in a situation to return 

 to Ferrol, the continuance of which 

 blockade was one main object of 

 my instructions, there would be no 

 force to oppose those squadrons, 

 and that they would more than pro- 

 bably have pushed for Ireland, or, 

 perhaps, England, to facilitate the 

 invasion which was then every mo- 

 ment expected. I really felt that I 

 should be running too great a ha- 

 zard, and putting my fleet into a si- 

 tuation of danger which I could nc- 

 xer have justified. 



I therefore judged it most pru- 

 dent to keep my squadron together, 

 and not to attempt to renew the 

 engagement unless the enemy oflcr- 

 ed it, or an opportunity allbrdcd 

 itself of my doing so, under more 

 favourable circumstances than at 

 that time presented themselves. 



7\t the same time conceiving that 

 their object might be to c'tthct a 

 junction with the ships at Fcrrol, I 

 determined, if possible, to prevent 

 their attaining that object, and to 

 keep myself between them and that 

 port, and, if possible, to draw them 

 to the northward, that, by so doing, 

 I might accompany the Windsor- 

 castle and prizes out of the reach of 

 the Rochefort squadron, and after- 

 •wards, perhaps, have, an opportu- 

 Bity of re-attacking the caemy, be- 



fore they could read* their own 

 shores. That this was the determi- 

 nation formed at the time, will ap- 

 pear from all u)y letters, and will be 

 proved by a witness whom 1 will 

 call to this ])oint. 



Having fornied this conclusion, I 

 acted upon it during the two days 

 that the enemy remained in sight, 

 keeping my squadron collected un- 

 der an easy sail, certainly never of, 

 fering, but as certainly never avoid- 

 ing an engagement, had the enemy 

 chosen to brnig it on. On the con- 

 trary, it has been proved, that, upon 

 all occasions where they bore down, 

 and had the appearance of an inten- 

 tion to engage us, 1 immediately 

 hauled my wind for the purpdse of* 

 receiving them ; and have nodoubt 

 but that, had they jjcrsevered in 

 what appeared to have been their 

 intention, though J believe it was 

 only done vauntingly, to use the 

 expression of one witness, or, as 

 another has said, only done for the 

 purpose of joining their lecwardmost 

 ships, and I<ee])ing their squadron to- 

 gether, they would have met with a 

 proper reception. If, however, at 

 any time, they really entertained 

 any such intention, tliey very soon 

 abandoned it; for, on all the occa- 

 sions I have mentioned, Ihey hauled 

 their v.iiul in a very short time after 

 they had be gun to bear down. 



During the whole of the 23d the 

 enemy had the wind ; at the close 

 of it they were at the distance of 

 more than four leagues. 1 made 

 signal that I should steer north-east, 

 and that every ship should carry a 

 light, to prevent seimration during 

 tlie night. 



At day-break in the morning of 

 the 24 th, the enemy's fleet was 

 west, six or seven leagues, seen only 

 from the mast-head. It is true, that , 



during ;. 



■iS; 



