STATE PAPERS. 



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the channels of prosperity and life, 

 by the aid of which England sup- 

 ports its monstrous existence. With 

 only a part of these suppositions 

 realized, yon will see every where, 

 and reason will see also, chances ter- 

 rible, and without counterbalance, 

 against Kngland. It is therefore in 

 the very consciousness of the strength 

 of his people, and of his own power, 

 that th-7 emperor found an additional 

 motive for speaking the language of 

 peace. It is with so many plans of 

 campaigns, the success of which is 

 probable, almost to certainty, inas- 

 much as that which is void of all 

 danger produces succcsscj so real ; 

 it is with this vast and rapid glance, 

 which embraces the whole extent of 

 his resources, and all the means of 

 drawing them forth, that his majesty 

 has taken a step which m oiild have 

 been shameful to a nation that had 

 a different chief — shameful for a 

 warrior commanding another peo- 

 ple. But could not this confidence 

 of the issue of the war with England 

 be disturbed by any uncertainty as 

 to the state of (he continental rela- 

 tions of France ? If there were any 

 danger of that, what could his ma- 

 jesty have hoped from a step taken 

 under such circumstances ? and the 

 history of his life evinces that no 

 man knew better how to seize the 

 favourable moment. If a continen- 

 tal war were impending. Napoleon 

 knew well that there was no other 

 course than the terrible and neces- 

 sary one of throwing away the scab- 

 bard of his so uniformly victorious 

 sword, and to make glitter before 

 the eyes of the world a new lance of 

 Achilles ; far from debasing the just 

 pride of his fortune, to propositions 

 dictated by fear, and suggested by 

 weakness, and which would have 

 prooiised but humiliation as their rc- 

 •ult. Happily, gentlemen, in this 



respect of our exterior relations on 

 the continent, two years have pro- 

 duced assuring and honourable ame- 

 liorations. The taking possession 

 of Hanover was necessary and indis- 

 pensable. The emperor willed, or- 

 dered, executed it. He did it to 

 pirnish the perfidy of a rupture 

 without declaration ; he did it to 

 secure to himself the means of com- 

 pensation in a war, in which pru- 

 dence may dread disadvantages, 

 from which wisdom has preserved 

 us ; he did it to fetter the commer- 

 cial relations of these dominators of 

 the seas, who carry on commerce by 

 war and war by commerce. Buf 

 this possession which, for the first 

 time, carried and fixed our armies 

 in t!ie extremities of the north, might 

 have alarmed the powers most at- 

 tached to our cause by their position, 

 the most united to our fortune bj 

 their interests, the most faithful to 

 our alliance by inclination. Diffi- 

 culties did in fact arise, but the wis- 

 dom, the moderation, the confidence 

 in the faith, of the cabinet of the 

 Thnillerics, and its remoteness from 

 every revolutionary and disorganis- 

 ing idea, dispelled all the clouds, and 

 never have we had with Prussia re- 

 lations better established, a corres- 

 pondence more cordial, amity more 

 intimate. On the other hand, if the 

 changes that have been effected in 

 the French government were called 

 for by experience, pointed out by 

 all men of sense, desired by the em- 

 lightcncd friends of the country, 

 willed by the entire nation, no one 

 could hope to operate it by the cre- 

 ating of a kingly monarchy ; and 

 the imperial title might give rise to 

 fears of discontent and coldness on 

 the part of Austria. The discontent 

 might become exasperated, and the 

 coldness might degenerate to resent- 

 ment by means of the intrigues ef 



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