230 ANNUAL REGISTER, 
existing government of England had 
manifested, but which effert only 
exposed it to the bitter resent- 
ment of the first consul, without 
the possibility of its having the 
slightest operation in favour of the 
cause it espoused. It was as ill- 
yadged, as ill-timed ; no ¢o-opera- 
tion of the continental powers had 
been solicited ; no national dignity 
exhibited in resenting the unanswer- 
ed and ineffectual remonstrance, at 
Paris; and the hour of interference 
was delayed, until the time and sea- 
son had elapsed, when assistance 
coulé have been at all effectual ! 
Consequences, however, the most 
important, resulted from this abor- 
tive attempt. In contemplation of 
the effects which this encouragement 
to the resistance of Switzerland might 
produce ; and as it was more likely 
that Bonaparte would persist in his 
violent measures, than recede: the 
English government thought it pru- 
dent, in the event of a war, to have 
some of those conquests in its hands, 
which had been so prodigally dis- 
posed of by the peace of Amiens. 
Orders were therefore dispatched to 
the English governors, or commian- 
ders in chiei, at the Cape of Good 
Hope, on the 17th of October, and 
also of the islands of Martinique, 
St. Lucie, Pebago, and Curacoa, 
and the Dutch settlements at Suri-+ 
nam, Demerara, Berbice, and Isse- 
quibo, to delay the restitution of 
those colonies, till farther orders. 
Though the general formulary of 
those instructions was addressed to 
the governors of all the above-named 
conquests, yet they are to be con- 
sidered as levelled principally at 
those of the Batavian republic ; as 
most of the islands, belonging to 
‘Fraijece, must have been in conse= 
1805. 
quence of orders sent out for that 
purpose at an earlier period, alrea- 
dy restored; or which event must 
have taken place before the latter 
orders could be received. Jt was 
otherwise, however, with respect to 
those of Holland, whose colonies 
would certainly be objects of the ut- 
most consequence in our possession, 
in the event of a rupture with France. 
Te wil) surely remain a paradox 
to all future time, and beyond the 
power of the most sagacious of our 
posterity to solve, how it came to 
pass that the idea of a restitution of 
those colonies, whose chief impor- 
tance was to be found in time of 
war, should have oceurred to the 
British government, under the mul- 
tiplied instances of bad faith, in- 
jury, and insult, constantly mani- 
fested by France, since the signa- 
ture of the definitive treaty ; and 
when the impossibility of executing 
some of its terms, rendered a ré- 
newal of hostilities more than pro- 
blematical. It will be nearly as dif- 
ficult to account for the having 
taken such a step, as that of en- 
couraging ahd promising to support 
the resistance, by force of arms, 
of the inhabitants of Switzerland, 
to the despotic will of France; 
after having passed over in silence 
and submission, those manifold 
causes of rupture, which the con- 
duct of the latter, towards Great 
Britain, taken even separately, had 
abundantly afforded. It may, how- 
ever, be presimed, that having suc- 
cessively acquiesced in the aggressive 
acts of the French government, yet 
not without some portion of mortifi- 
cation and resentmetit, that ministers 
were eager to interfere on an occa- 
sion, in which, connected as it was 
with the general feclings & it 
t) 
