-° HISTORY OF EUROPE. 55 
such as the surrender of the island 
to the order of St, John; the suze- 
rain rights thereto of the king of the 
' two Sicilies; the guaranty ‘of its 
independence; and the provision 
for the future garrison of its forts, 
: were ddeiitified with its) nay,, the 
admission of native Maltese into the 
. civil government of the order, a 
point on which some difficulty and 
cause of delay might have arisen, 
was conceded. It might for a mo- 
; ment be supposed, that the E nelish 
government, after a per tinacious so- 
licitation of six months, would have 
received this notification with joy, 
and eagerly have embraced its con- 
ditions: but,its situation was now 
widely different; and to procrastinate 
was become as much its object, as be- 
fore it had been to manifest expedi- 
tion in concluding this negociation, 
Although the British ministers 
had submitted to the contemptuous 
silence with which Bonaparte had 
zerland; © notwithstanding — their 
counter orders to those which had 
commanded the detention of the 
conquered colonies, and ‘their post- 
tive direction, issued for the evacu- 
ation of Alexandria, had evinced 
“their cagerness to extinguish the 
spark of vigour in their resolvés, 
which the affairs of Switzerland had 
enkindled. Notwithstanding their 
-solemn assurances to parliament, on 
the 23d of November, that ho hos- 
tile discussions whatever existed be- 
tween England and France, were 
the strongest pledges and manifesta- 
tion of their intentions to preserve 
ake speace of Amiens; yet was there 
one point which it was not possible 
to guard against, and which might, 
th, notwithstanding every submission 
e ane fort tothec contrary, place Eng- 
SE eS 
4 a + 
' 
ee 
& 
> 
treated their remonstrance on Swit- 
land in an actual state of warfare. 
We allude to the detention of the 
Cape, and the other Dutch, colonies; 
if, unfortunately for the wishes of 
ministers, the counter orders had not 
reached their destination, time e- 
‘nough to prevent the operation of 
the first; in which case, the recap- 
ture of those places, (for such might 
have been the consequence from 
the nature of the last dispatches) 
would place Great Britain in de- 
cidedly an hostile point of view, 
and as the aggressor, in the event 
of afresh rupture. It may also be 
supposed, that the deep indignation 
which obtained throughout all ranks 
of the people; the undisguised ambi- 
tion, and intolerable arrogance of 
Bonaparte, had theiy werglit,in mak- 
ing still more wavering and unde- 
cided, the measures. of the English 
government; and, above all, the 
sense of parliament, which, since 
its meeting. had exhibited a species 
of opposition, composed of the real 
weight, talent, and property of the 
country, not to be resisted even by 
ministerial influence, had produced 
some hesitation in their agreeing 
to propositions, which would have 
thrown away thelast pledge of peace 
or security in the hands of their 
country. “Under these circum- 
stances, and wishing to have in the 
event of a war (which either their 
own indiscretfon, rashness, or the 
‘all“of an incensed and outraged 
nation might give rise to,) one 
at least of the lunumerable .con- 
quests achieved by British va- 
lour during the late contest, in 
their ands. at its commence- 
ment; and that too, one of such 
consequence, as might blind the 
country to the dreadiul inconsisten- 
cy of their having given up, at the 
RS same 
