266 ANNUAL REGISTER, 
substance what we have already 
detailed in lord Whitworth’s answers 
to M. Talleyrand, on the same 
subject; also a reiteration of 
the demand for satisfaction, in 
the affair of Sebastiani; and fresh 
security for the fulfilment of any 
new arrangement that should be 
made on the subject of Malta, be- 
tween the two countries, 
In a few days after the king’s 
message to parliament was deliver- 
ed, it became public at Paris: the 
consternation and anxiety it BLO, 
duced in the mind of the first con-’ 
sul, may be best conceived, from 
the minute detail of his conduct to 
the English ambassador, when the 
latter made his appearance at the 
court of the Thuilleries, on the first 
day of ceremony, subsequent 2 the 
promulgation of the message*, A 
memorandum or outline of. the de- 
termination of the French govern- 
ment, in consequence of the pre- 
parations announced in Great Bri- 
taint, had been previously com- 
municated to the ambassador, and 
by him transmitted to his court; 
which instrument gives such a view 
of the despotic power attained 
by France throughout Europe, as 
must afford matter of lasting appre- 
hension and alarm to every state on 
the continent, which has not de- 
termined quictly to submit to the 
approaching subjugation destined 
for it by Bonaparte. It begins by 
disclaiming the having any arma- 
ment on foot, save that at Helvoet- 
sluys, evidently destined for coloni- 
al purposes, and now ready for sea ; 
but which, in consequence of the 
message of the king of Great Bri- 
¥ Vide Official Correspondence, No, 43. 
t Ibid. 
Note Verbale reterred to in No. 42 
1803. 
tain to his parliament, should be 
countermanded. Butif the French 
gvovernment did not receive satis- 
factory explanations on that mea- 
sure, and if the arming of England 
actually took place, that it would 
then be natural that the first con- 
sul should move 20,000 men into 
Holland—form an encampent on 
the frontiers of [anover—conti- 
nue the military occupation of Swit- 
zerland — advance a fresh force 
upon Italy—and seize upon ‘Taren- 
tum ;—with many other offensive 
and defensive measures of prepara- 
tion, which would be in that eveat 
immediately adopted by France. 
We have selected the above, how- 
ever, to shew with what ease, and 
how naturally the French ruler 
could determine on inflicting all the 
distresses and horrors attendant on 
military occupation and exaction, 
(for who shall separate their effects, 
even in idea?) on so vast a portion 
of neutral Europe, which took no 
part orinterest in the quarrel of the 
two countries of France and Eng- 
land ; and who were or should be 
protected in their rights, not only 
by the universally ‘acknowledged 
public law of Europe, but by re- 
peated treaties with the very power 
whose menace now iImpended oyer 
them, and to all of which some or 
other of the greater continental 
powers were parties! Thus expli- 
citly did Bonaparte avow, that 
Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, 
were subject to his power, when- 
ever he was disposed to exert it; 
and he speaks with the same ease 
and confidence of his violating, with 
impunity, the rights of the German 
19 
wt 
empire. 
a 
