HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
stances not unusual in such. lati- 
tudes, though not dispatched till 
after the intervention of a month, 
arrived on the heels of the former, 
The message and its effects would 
now have been gladly withdrawn, but 
it was too late; ministers were pledg- 
ed to prove the existence of arma- 
ments, to an alarming extent, and of 
*‘ important discussions,” at Paris, as 
the cause of the message. which by 
arming the country had disturbed its 
tranquillity, encreased its expendi- 
ture, and had given the most serious 
cause of offence and complaint to 
France. 
Tocffect this, was however, a task, 
which even the confidence of num- 
bers could not inspire ministers with 
the hope of effecting, to the satisfac- 
tion of parliament and the country. 
In this dilemma, they directed their 
utmost efforts to induce the late min- 
ister to take an active share in the 
administration. Under the protee- 
tion of his great name, with the assis- 
tance of his pre-eminent talents and 
abilities, whatever were the issue 
of the present negociation, whe- 
ther it'were peace or war, behind 
his shield they would have conceived 
themselves invulnerabie. 
For a considerable period of time, 
it was well known that the ‘concert 
and good understanding which bad 
originally subsisted between the late 
and present ministers, had gradu- 
ally lessened, and had, at length, 
totally ceased: the moment of ne- 
cessity, however, now approached, 
and overtures were made to regain 
that co-operation and_ assistance 
which, in the hour of boastful con- 
fidence, was either neglected or 
unsalicited. The origin, progress, 
277 
and termination of the negociation 
for this purpose, we have already 
detailed.* During its continua- 
tion, repeated adjournments of par- 
liament at home, kept discussion at 
a distance; whilst, at Paris, the 
different modifications of the ori- 
ginal proposition of retaining Malta 
in perpetuity, were successively and 
anxiously tendered for the accepta- 
tion of the French government. 
We have seen, that although the 
firmness of the first consul never 
gave way on the point of Malta 
remaining in British hands, yet his 
wish to avoid war, in his present 
unprepared state, induced him to 
make every concession that could be 
considered as demanded or evenim- 
posed by the English government, 
in consequence of Sebastiani’s re- 
port. The integrity of the Turkish 
empire was to be secured; Malta, 
the great object of dispute and jea- ; 
lousy, Bonaparte offered to place 
in the hands of Russia, Austria, or 
Prussia; even the doctrine of the 
right of compensation and equiva- 
lent to Great Britain, for the acqui- 
sitions of France, was not attempted 
to be denied or evaded ; and a con- 
vention, for that express purpose, 
wouid, if demanded, have doubtless 
beenconeeded. From the disposi- 
tion manifested by the court of Rus- 
sla, its mediation might have been 
confidently looked to, at the moment 
when the negociation abruptly con- 
cluded; and which if accepted, in 
all human probability, had averted 
the scourge and evils of war 
The entire failure however of the 
attempt to induce Mr. Pit to return 
to office, was decisive upo. the con- 
duct of ministers. —As the treaty 
* Vide page 213. 
de 
