HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
esnditions for the king of Sardinia; 
of whom no mention had been made 
in the treaty of Amiens, and in 
whose cause ministers had, more 
than once since that period, for- 
mally disclaimed any interest.— 
The alarming deficit in the public 
revenue—the unconstitutional and 
dangerous conduct of concealing 
from parliament the real state of 
the country—and the delusive as- 
surances of peace, constantly held 
out to the public, at a time when 
the continuation of tranquillity was, 
if not morally impossible, at least 
extremely problematical. — The 
** Official Correspondence*” ap- 
pended hereto, will afford every 
requisite deoree of supplemental in- 
formation, on the subject of the 
causes of renewed hostility. 
From the manner in which we have 
descanted on the conduct of the Eng- 
lish government, during a short and 
feverish interval of peace, it must 
not be supposed that we do not think 
the war commenced with France, 
abstractedly considered, as just and 
necessary. If ever there existed one 
to which both those epithets could be 
applied with scrupulous propriety, 
the presentisthatone. The series of 
ainprovoked insults and injuries of- 
fered by France to Great Britain ; 
and her alarming and despotic in- 
terference in the affairs of the rest of 
Europe; however they might have 
been passed over by a too timid or 
too conciliating administration; are 
not the less the legitimate objects of 
British resentment and British ven- 
‘geance. Our end and aim have 
been (and in which we beg not to 
be mistaken) independently of the 
narrative of the Jeading events which 
fall within the limits of our volume, 
278 
to point out the evils which must. 
ever arise toa great nation, from hav- 
ing its concerns entrusted, in times 
of danger and difficulty, to the gul- 
dance of weak and wavering coun- 
cils—from the abandonment of 
those principles of sound policy 
which have come down to posterity, 
sanctioned by the practice of the 
wisest nations—from the adoption 
of a temporizing system, and doc 
trines founded on momentary expe- 
diency—from the ceding the minut- 
est point in debate to a powerful and 
ambitious rival, by which alone na- 
tional honer could be compromised, 
without providing for national secu- 
rity—in fine, from that pusillamimity 
which, become apparent in trivial 
concessions, must merely tend to 
produce farther and more important 
requisitions. Had the determina- 
«tions of the existing government of 
Great Britain, since the peace, been 
governed by principles such as 
these; we are confident that either 
Bonaparte would have been forced 
to recede, long since, from his unjust 
and tyrannical projects; or that 
England would have recommenced 
the contest, with a veteran and 
numerous military establishment;—— 
a well-equipped and increasing ma- 
rine;—the conquests of the last glo- 
rious war in her possession ;—stead- 
fast and powerful allies: altogether 
forming an aggregate of natural and 
acquired strength, with which,(under 
providence) well directed, she might 
reasonably have hoped to secure the 
liberties, and avenge the injuries of 
Europe. From the consequences 
to be apprehended from the very op- 
opsite line of conduct pursued, 
may that providence be her protec- 
tion! 
* That no document on this most important subject may be wanting to our readers, 
the * additiowal papers” shal} be insested in the following volume, 
CHAE: 
