ie 
; HEPSTORY OF) EUROPE 
4welye months, had been carried to 
such an extent, that England was 
degraded, and her honor for ever 
lost, if she did not again appeal to 
the decision of the sword; to the 
spirit of the British nation; to the 
energies that form the proud cha- 
‘racteristic of a free people; and 
above all, to that over-ruling Pro- 
vidence, under whose guidance she 
had so often asserted triumphantly 
- her own cause, and that of the op- 
pressed, in defiance of the power, 
ov the most formidable efforts, of 
her enemies. In etiect, his majes- 
‘ty’s declaration conveyed that so- 
_lemn appeal; the treaty of Amiens 
was now atan end, and the second 
war actually commenced between 
this country and revolutionary 
* France. 
Notwithstanding the declara- 
tion took place late in the month 
of May; yet on the date of 
his majesty’s message in March, it 
may be said the signal of war was 
given, ‘There was indeed a negoti- 
ution opened at Paris, as we have 
seen, which lasted more than six 
weeks, but of a nature from which 
nothing finally amicable could be 
- hoped, and from that day, war ap- 
peared inevitable. In writing the 
history of our own times, we may 
fairly appeal to the recollection of 
every person in the country, as to 
the impression which that message 
made: it was felt in parliament; 
it was felt at court; it was felt in 
the city; it was felt every where, 
and by every person of common 
sense, as the sure precursor of a 
rupture. [t may be supposed then 
that it was considered in the 
same light at Paris and at the 
_ Thuilleries. 3onaparte himself 
“was so convinced of its decision, 
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281 
that on meeting the assembled 
diplomacy of Europe, at hisdrawing- 
room, he could not restrain his 
motions within the common limits 
of court etiquette and ascertained 
decorum, but advanced directly to 
Lord Whitworth, the British ambas- 
sador, and addressed to him that in- 
sulting and unprecedented species of 
remonstrance so inconsistent with 
the respect due to an ambassador: 
and of which we have given a detail- 
ed account in our last chapter. 
The message therefore was not 
only the prelude to the declaration 
of war, but from its nature induced 
the French as well as the British go- 
vernment tomake every possible pre- 
paration for carrying on hostilities 
with efect, should the negociation 
terminate unfavourably. In consid- 
“ering the events aud progress of the 
rupture, it will be materially im- 
portant to consider its Commence- 
ment, as from the date of that 
message ; both nations then begin- 
ning to develope their respective 
means of attack and annoyance, 
The island of Malta, which was the 
immediate cause of the war, was so 
strong, from its fortifications, aid 
ao well ghrrisened, that France 
could not entertain the slightest 
hope of its conquest by force, and 
yet the possession of it was of the 
utmost importance in the eyes of 
Bonaparte. It was that object witich 
had caused the greatest difficulty in 
the negociations at Amiens; and we 
have scen that the first consul ex- 
pressly told lord Whitworth, that 
he would rather of, the two give up 
one of the suburbs of Paris to Lng- 
land, than allow her to retain that 
island! Although this expres:ion 
cannot be taken literally, it shews: 
he wever, the strong sense he had of 
the 
