288 
ces to the invasion and conquest of 
Great Britain. It was to this dar- 
ling object of his ambition that Bo- 
naparte applied the large sums which 
he had obtained from America for 
the sale of Louisiana, those from 
Portugal as the price of peace, and 
the contributions from Spain, Italy 
and the Hanse Towns either in the 
shape of military levy or of loan. 
’ From the very commencement of 
the war, every preparation was made 
to carry into effect the menace 
which he had thrown out to lord 
Whitworth of invading England. 
Independently of his grand fleet at 
Brest, which was presumed to be 
destined for the invasion of Ireland, 
an immense number of transports 
was ordered to be built and collect- 
ed with the greatest expedition. 
The success of the Spanish eun- 
boats off Algeziras during the last 
war, had made the Fiench believe 
that it would be possible for some 
thousands of similarly constructed 
vessels, but built on an improved 
plan, to force their way across the 
channelin spite of the British navy. 
This idea was universally received 
fn France, and in the course of the 
year such astonishing exertions were 
tnade, that a sufficient flotilla was 
assembled at Boulogne, to carry over 
- any army that France should choose 
so toemploy. ‘This menacing disposi- 
tion and the mighty preparations for 
carrying it into efiect, were perhaps 
ultimately advantagcous to Great 
Britain, The evident necessity of 
defending the country against in- 
vasion Obtained a ready consent to 
every plan which could be proposed 
for increasing its military defence. 
Independently of the regular and 
stpplementary militia an addition- 
ANNUAL‘REGISTER, 
whole co!lected strength and resour-' 
1803, 
al army of 50,000 men was proposed 
under the title of an army of reserve, - 
and a general levy en masse of alt 
persons capable of bearing arms, 
was universaliy approved of: this 
measure was however rendered un- 
necessary by the spirit of the coun- 
try, which in a short time presented 
above 300,000 effective volunteers, 
as anadditional defence to the coun 
try. This vast reinforcement to its 
military strength, placed it on so 
proud a footing of security that the 
English natiqn no longer feared the 
visit of their invadeis, but felt so 
conscious of their strength as rather 
to wish the enemy to try that ex- 
periment; which should it fail, 
would probably determine not only 
the reputation, but the dominiomw 
and power of Bonaparte. 
The French government however 
was perfectly competent in the 
course of the year, to ascertain, that 
an immense flotilla could be assem- 
bled at Boulogne, without much in- 
terruption from the English crui- 
zers; it only remains for France 
to try whether their whole collected 
naval force can venture across the 
channel in the face of those squad- 
rons which England can oppose: to 
them, and w hether even then, they 
can reasonably hope to land a sufh- 
cient body of treops to conquer that 
country in its present improved 
state of defence. Should they prove 
unequal to this task the consequence 
of the menace will be, that England 
will become more a military nation 
than she has hitherto exhibited her- 
self, and consequently will be enabled 
to send larger armies either to the 
relief of her allies, or to the conquest 
of the colonies of France, and those 
of the powers she may have forced 
into her alliance In this contest 
Great 
