HISTORY! OF EUROPE. 
ations. Although the French go- 
vernment had calculated extremely 
well the force, which, according to 
all human probability would have 
been sufficient to conquer and re- 
tain possession of the colony, yet 
the dreadful fever which broke out 
in the beginning of ‘summer in the 
French army ; baffled all their mea- 
$ures, and rendered them totally un- 
ble to put down this second insur- 
_ rection. The troops however defend- 
ed'themselves well against the at- 
tacks of the negroes, and generally 
routed them with great slaughter. 
Tue first'serious attempt made by 
' the blacks in the north, was on the 
Mole, where general Brunet com- 
manded. That officer permitted them 
to advance quite close to the works, 
but by an ambuscade, which he had 
previously laid, placed them be- 
tween two fires, and forced them 
to retreat in’ confusion,’ and with 
considerable loss. In all the strong 
posts on the sea coasts, the French 
defended their positions with equal 
~ success. The insurgents, although 
completely masters of the interior of 
the country and of the mountains, 
were not able to cope in the plain 
with the French troops; and this 
inequality was still more observa- 
ble, when they attempted to attack 
the French in their fortified ant 
or strong positions. r 
Such then was the situation of 
affairs in this once flourishing and 
happy island, at the breaking out 
of the war between France and 
' England. We have already ob- 
served, that the French were in 
possession of a line of posts, on the 
sea coast, which were mutually 
supported by the facilities which 
their fleet afforded them of mu- 
‘wal transportation. | This great ad- 
388 
vantage the war with England to- 
tally deprived them of. The Caps 
and all their principal positions, 
were’ immediately blockaded by 
British squadrons, which blockade 
not only broke the chain which had 
hitherto firmly bound the French 
force together, but by cutting off 
the supply of provisions and rein- 
forcements, accelerated, or ‘with 
more justice may be said \to have 
been: the direct cause of, their-ca- 
pitulation and surrender to the 
black for¢e, which composed the 
besieging army; for, in all ‘hu- 
man probability, had not hostilities 
commenced between England and 
France, the insurgents must finally 
have been subdued aid extermi- 
nated. While the French were mas- 
ters of the seas, it does not appear 
that the negroes were able to possess 
themselves of even one of the towns 
on the coast; and there cannot be a 
doubt, but that so long as the ocean 
could be traversed in safety, France, 
in her immense population of thirty 
millions, would have found suf- 
ficient reinforcements to have final- 
ly subjugated the revolters. And 
if inthe course of the winter of 
1802, she did not pursue this po- 
licy, -it was merely because the 
first’successes of Le Clerc made it 
appear unnecessary: and the se- 
cond general insurrection would ne- 
ver have taken place, had it not been 
for the destruction which the fever 
produced among the French troops. 
—The English squadrons, however, 
by shutting up the ports of St. 
Domingo against all succours and 
supplies from Europe, contribut- 
eed at leastas much as the efforts 
of the insurgents, to the total aban- 
donment of that great and va- 
luable colony, by France. 
It 
