b eA, 
dh ANNUAL REGISTER, 1806. 
the safety of his person: and there 
could be no doubt, that it was to 
her enmity, he was chiefly indebted 
for the late confederacy against him, 
which, with such good fortune and 
distinguished ability, he had de- 
feated and put down. England 
once subdued, he might plausibly 
argue, he would be the sole and un- 
disputed master of the universe: 
but, while England retained her in- 
dependence, her maritime superio- 
rity, and her inveteracy against him, 
he must expect to be thwarted inall 
+his commercial and colonial views, 
confined to the continent of Europe, 
and compelled, for safety, to sur- 
round his throne with an armed 
force, instead of emerging, as hede- 
sired, from the precarious and un- 
certain condition of a military chief, 
to be the head of a regular govern- 
ment, and the founder of a dynasty 
of kings. 
That Bonaparte, after the re- 
newal of hostilities, was animated 
by the most implacable hatred 
against England, and that he thence. 
forward considered her govern- 
ment, as the etevnal enemy of his 
peace and repose, cannot well be 
doubted: but why he chose to be- 
gin the war with such ostentatious 
threats of invasion, such insolent 
denunciations of vengeance, is a 
point net easy to decide. It may 
have been merely to give vent to his 
own spleen, or to spirit up his peo- 
ple to a new war, that he used such 
impolitic, such unbecoming lan- 
guage towards his enemy. He 
may have acted from a deeper, 
though mistaken calculation, and 
supposed, that if he could terrify 
the English nation with the sound 
of his preparations, their govern- 
ment would yield to his terms ; and, 
indeed, the publicity which he af. 
fected to give at this time to all his 
plans and operations, would seem 
to countenance such a conjecture. 
He may possibly have under-rated 
the difficulties of invasion, and se. 
riously intended at first to carry his 
menaces into effect. But, if his ob- 
ject in these measures was to obtain 
peace by intimidation, never was his 
sagacity more in fault. The English 
were exasperated, not intimidated 
by his threats, and the little confi- 
dence, which they reposed at that 
time in the vigour of their own go- 
vernment, served only to call forth, 
in brighter colours, their zeal and 
ardour in defence of their country. 
It would neither be consonant to 
reason to believe, nor agreeable to 
truth to assert, that it was patrio- 
tism alone, which filled the ranks 
of the volunteers. | Exemptio 
from more dangerous aud more dis- 
agreeable service contributed, no 
doubt, to swell the numbers of these 
citizen soldiers. But, it cannot be 
denied, that the spirit which the 
English nation manifested on this 
occasion, shewed at once their be- 
lief in the sincerity of Bonaparte’s 
threats, and proved how far he had 
been mistaken in supposing, that 
their minds were enervated by 
luxury, or their military ardour 
extinguished by commerce. 
But, though the body of the En- 
glish people were thoroughly per- 
suaded, that Bonaparte meant 
speedily to invade them, and waited 
only for a favourable opportunity 
to embark his forces ; and, though 
there were men of talents and con- 
sideration in the country, who be- 
lieved, or affected to believe, that 
such was his intention; those who 
had considered well his character, 
when they reflected on the difficul- 
ties and uncertainty of the attempt, 
could 
