HISTORY OF EUROPE. 5 
could not bring themselves to be- 
lieve, that he was in earnest in his 
threats. Such reasoners alledged, 
that, of all men, who had risen from 
an obscure situation to a throne, 
Bonaparte was the most prudent and 
wary; that his caution and circum- 
spection in forming his plans, were 
as remarkable as his boldness and 
activity in carrying them into exe- 
cution; that no man had ever 
trusted so little to fortune, or used 
so many precautions to ensure 
success in all his enterprises ; 
that though no one had _ ever 
displayed greater presence of mind, 
or manifested greater resources in 
danger, noman had ever shewn him- 
Self more averse to engage unneces. 
sarily in hazardous undertakings, 
or more disposed to distrust his 
fortune in the hour of success. His 
moderation in victory, which he af- 
fected to call magnanimity, they at- 
tributed to his prudence ; and the 
offers and professions of peace, 
which he was continually addressing 
to his enemies, they regarded, not 
as mere traps for popularity, but as 
indications of a frame, of mind, 
which, though‘actuated by the most 
restless ambition, and the sport at 
times of the most ungovernable tem- 
per, was nevertheless too thorough- 
ly impressed with the instability of 
human affairs, not to seek every 
opportunity of guarding against the 
uncertainty of fortune. But, with 
such an opinion of Bonaparte’s cha- 
racter, it was difficult to believe him 
sincere in his threats of invasion 
against England. For, though the 
numbers and discipline of his army, 
the excellence of his officers, the 
genius and experience of his gene- 
rals, might inspire him with the 
most confident hopes of success, 
provided the military force of his 
empire could be brought into con- 
tact with that of England; what 
expectations could he reasonably 
entertain, of transporting to her 
shores an army of sufficient 
force to subdue the country ; and, 
if he landed with an army of infe« 
rior, and therefore inadequate 
strength, what chatice had he, de. 
prived of the assistance of a fleet, 
of maintaining his communications 
with thexcontinent ? But, while the 
invasion of England was difficult 
and unpromising of success, the 
consequences of failing in so great 
an enterprise, deserved the most 
Serious consideration. Besides the 
disgrace that necessarily attends 
miscarriage in affairs of such magni- 
tude; the injurious effects of the 
loss of reputation to a military chief, 
whose popularity was founded on 
his uninterrupted successes ; the 
probability of discontent and mu- 
tiny in his army, at the sight of so 
many thousands of their comrades 
saerificed to an experiment, which, 
if it failed, every one was sure to 
condemn; was it not clear, that 
the continental powers, whom 
France had recently hnmbled and 
defeated, would be roused by her 
misfortune, ‘to try once more with 
her the chance of war? Was the 
disaster of Aboukir already forgot- 
ten, or the formidable coalition to 
which it gave rise? Was Russia 
less hostile to France than in the 
time of Paul, or Austria better re- 
conciled to the loss of so many of 
her ancient provinces? But, while 
there were so many reasons against 
attempting the invasion of England, 
Bonaparte had no urgent cause for 
stirring at all, and the prospect of 
many advantages by remaining per- 
fectly quiet. The presence of his 
army at Boulogne was sufficient 
B 3 without 
