12 
his conduct in regard to it is the 
touchstone ‘by which posterity will 
try his claims to that honourable 
distinction. It is in vain to say, 
that the French revolution was an 
event without a precedent. It is 
the part of a greatstatesman to steer 
his way in safety, where there is no 
precedent to direct him., But 
though it must be always a matter 
of uncertainty, whether a different 
policy from that pursued by Mr. 
Pitt would have been more fortu- 
nate than his, itcannot be denied, 
that a more complete failure of 
success than attended his efforts to 
check the progress of the revolu. 
tion, cannot well be imagined. Had 
he interfered, as Mr. Fox in his si- 
tuation would probably have done, 
at an early period of the revolution, 
to prevent the great continental 
powers from intermeddling in the 
affairs of France, and disturbing 
the settlement of her government, 
the direful events that followed, 
might possibly have been prevented, 
and France, at any rate, if left to 
herself, could never have become 
such a military power as she is at 
present. Had he, on the other 
hand, followed the counsels of Mr. 
Burke, and taken part decidedly 
with the royalists, he might possi- 
bly have destroyed the republican 
government in its infancy, and re- 
established the Bourbons on their 
throne. But he chose to take a 
middle course, which, though com- 
monly the safest in ordinary occur- 
rences, has been always found the 
most dangerous in great emergen- 
cies, Its effect on the present oc- 
casion was to rouze the republicans 
against him, without attaching the 
royalists to his party, and to excite 
an alarm among Frenchmen of all 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1806. 
descriptions, that his intentions were 
merely to weaken the power and 
dismember the territories of France. 
His wavering and uncertain policy, 
so unlike that of a great statesman, 
is not, however, to be entirely at- 
tributed to his want of original ge. 
nius, but was owing in part to his 
excessive love of popularity, and to 
his habits of contemplating all ob- 
jects with reference to their effect | 
in parliament. If he could not 
destroy French anarchy, it was 
something to boast of in the house 
of commons, that he had taken the 
French sugar-islands. If he could 
not restore the throne of the Bour. 
bons, he was, in some degree, satis- 
fied with having a new sceptre; to 
place in the hands of his own sove- 
reign. If the French armies were 
victorious, he comforted his coun- 
trymen with accounts of the lowness 
of their funds ; and argued to the 
conviction of his hearers, that there 
could be no stability in the republi- 
cap government, because the French 
five per cents were only at 17, when 
the English three per cents were 
above 50. It is extraordinary, that, 
withso little system in his operations 
against France, he was so’ pertina- 
cious in his hostility towards her ; 
that, when he ceased to have any 
rational object in the war, he con- 
tinued to be so obstinately averse 
to peace. The true key to this in. 
consistency in his conduct, it may 
be difficult to give; but, the fact is 
much to be lamented; for, to the 
long continuance of the war, may, 
in a great measure, be attributed all 
the evils that Europe suffers, or is 
likely yet to suffer, from the arms 
of France. 
His power as a minister was for 
many years unbounded, but the° 
circum. — 
