28 
courts of common Jaw.” This mo- 
tion was supported by lords Eldon, 
Boringdon, Mulgrave, and Hawkes- 
bury; and opposed by lord St. 
John, the earls of Carlisle and Car- 
marvon, viscount Sidmouth, and 
Jords Holland and Grenville. The 
question being put, the motion was 
negatived without a division. 
On the same day resolutions of a 
sitnilar tendency were moved in the 
house of commons by Mr. Spencer 
Stanhope. They were supported 
by Mr. Canning, lord Castlereagh, 
. Mr. Percival, and Mr. Wilberforce ; 
and opposed by Mr. Bond, lord 
Temple, Mr. Fox, lord Henry 
Petty, and Mr. Sheridan. The pre- 
vious question being put on the first 
resolution, was carried by a majo- 
rity of 158, Ayes 222—Noes 64. 
It was contended by the opposi- 
tion, that there had been no prece- 
dent since the revolution, of a chief 
justice being at the same time a ca- 
binet minister, except the solitary 
ease of lord Mansfield, which, from 
its injurious effects on the character 
and reputation of that celebrated 
judge, was rather a beacon to be 
shunned than an example to be 
followed. It was argued from 
Montesquieu and Blackstone, that 
it was a fundamental maxim of all 
free governments, and a recognized 
pritciple of the English constitu. 
tion, to keep separate and distinct 
the legislative, executive, and judi- 
ciary powers of the state. It was 
urged, that in vain had parliament 
passed the most salutary acts to se- 
cure the independence of the 
Judges, if the allurement of so high 
and honourable a situation as a 
place in the cabinet, could be used 
as an enticement to detach them 
from their proper business, and 
connect them with the parties and 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1806. 
politics of the day. It was de. 
manded, whether a judge, who had 
been associated with the delibera- 
tions of the ministers, and become a 
party to all their measures and feel- 
ings, could be deemed a proper per- 
son to conduct state trials, or to 
preside at trials for libels or sedi- 
tion, to which those ministers must 
of necessity be parties, either as 
prosecutors or as culprits? Was it 
right in itself, or compatible with 
the pure and unbiassed mind, which 
should belong to a judge, that the 
same person who had been present 
at the deliberations of the council 
which determined to try an offence, 
who had possibly been the indivi. 
dual counsellor by whose advise 
that resolution had been adopted, 
and who had assisted and taken an 
active part in all the previous in- 
quiries and examinations of the case, 
should at length preside over, and 
conduct the trial, charge the jury, 
and, if a verdict was found for the 
prosecution, award, and in many 
cases arbitrarily fix, the degree of 
punishment? An _ upright judge 
might preserve his impartiality in 
these circumstances, but it would 
be difficult to persuade the public 
that he had no bias, no leaning to- 
wards his colleagues. He might © 
administer justice with purity and 
integrity, though a cabinet minister, 
but his acceptance of a cabinet 
place would materially lessen the 
confidence of the public in his de- 
cisions, whenever questions of a po- 
litical nature were tried before him. 
But a judge should not only be 
above all bias, but above all sus- 
picion of bias. ‘* It was not enough 
that the administration of justice 
should be perfectly free and unin- 
fluenced by government; it was 
not enough that it should be pure, 
‘ meat but 
