HISTORY -OF EUROPE. 
, 
measure taken for encreasing the 
army, after the commencement of 
the present war,was avowedly a tem- 
| porary expedient, and, though un- 
yust in its principle, and partial and 
unequal in its application, as all 
levies by ballot must necessarily be, 
except in cases of clear and urgent 
necessity, and for purposes of self- 
defence, it had in a cousiderable 
degree attained its object. It had 
added, in less than ten months, 
more than 40,000 men to our army, 
and though the troops levied under 
this act, were bound to serve only 
in Great Britain, Ireland, and the 
_ adjacent islands, it indirectly in- 
creased the amount of our disposa- 
ble force, by enabling us, if neces- 
Sary, to send abroad a greater por- 
tion of our regular army, on any 
service, for which it might be re- 
quired. But, the injustice of em- 
ploying the odious and oppressive 
_ operation of the ballot for producing 
this effect, appeared from the single 
fact, that, of 40,000 men obtained 
by the army of reserve bill, there 
were only 2,000 of those who were 
drawn, that served in person, and 
consequently 38,000 were substi- 
4] 
tutes, procured by private indivi- 
duals, through the means of high 
bounties and voluntary enlistment. 
But, if 38,000 substitutes could be 
procured for money by private in- 
dividuals, the same number of re- 
cruits wight have been obtained by 
government, and, consequently, the 
ballot, which is only to be justified 
on theground of urgent necessity, 
might have been dispensed with, 
without the loss of a single man to 
the army. Not only was the ope- 
ration of this bill partial and unjust, 
because, instead of raising men at 
the expence of the community, cut 
of the general revenue of the state, 
it compelled private individuals, of 
a certain age, on whom the lot hap- 
pened to fall, to find substitutes at 
their own expence and out of their 
private funds ; but, in consequence 
of the competition of so many eager 
and unpractised recruiting officers, 
as it was sure to produce, the boun- 
ties for enlistment rose so high, that, 
after destroying the ordinary re- 
cruiting for the regular army, the 
operation of the bill was suspended 
by its authors, while the number of 
men to be raised by it was still in- 
hams plan, was greater than the number raised in the first balf of 1805, by the 
ordinary recruiting, the recruiting fue rank, and the additional force bill, taken 
- together, 
The superiority of Mr. Windham’s plan will be rendered still more apparent by 
_ shewing the progressive rise in the rate of recruiting, during the year of its undis- 
turbed operation, that is, from the 1st. of July, 1806 to the 1st. of July 1807. 
- Rate of Recruiting for the Year 
From it. July to 1st. of October 1806 - 
= 11,000 
ist. October 1806 to 1st. January 1807 - 13,000 
—— ist. Jantary to 1st. April 1807 - - 21,000 
1st. Aprilto 1st July 1807 - - 24,000 
_ It is no less true that desertion from the army became less frequent during its 
‘Operation. In the second half of 1805, desertions from the army of Great 
Britain and Ireland were in the proportion of one to 157. During the year 
when Mr. Windham’s plan was undisturbed, they were reduced to the propor- 
_ tion of one to 263: but as soon as the succeeding ministry began to tamper with 
his system, desertions became more numerous again, and in the second half of 
7807, rose to the proportion of one to 227. 
com plete, 
