HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
new military arrangements, by stat- 
ing, that the expectations enter. 
tained on the other side of the 
house, that some radical change in 
our military system, weuld be the 
consequence of the present ministers 
coming into power, were reasona- 
ble and just, and warranted by the 
language of himself and his friends 
when in opposition; but that the 
expectation of some immediate 
change following, without the 
‘smallest delay, his own appointment 
to office, was neither justified by his 
past declarations, nor countenanced 
by the nature of the proceedings he 
had uniformly recommended ; that 
it had never been his object to limit - 
our views to a temporary expedient 
to meet the present exigency, but 
to provide a permanent security 
against a permanent danger; that 
in the measures he was about to 
recommend, ‘* care was of more 
importance than time, and it was 
better that whatever was done 
should be done rightly, than that it 
should be done speedily.’ After 
some sarcastic and ludicrous observa. 
tions on theconductof the gentlemen 
opposite, who after having * clubbed 
the battalion,” or, in other words, 
thrown every thing into disorder, 
seemed to exult in the confusion 
they had made, he proceeded to his 
Tain argument, the purport of 
which was to shew, that the de- 
fence and security of civilized na- 
tions must depend entirciy on the 
excellence of their regular armies ; 
that no species of irregular force 
could be employed with any chance 
of success against regular troops, 
except in very peculiar circum- 
Stances, which were totally inappli- 
cable to the warfare between France 
and England; that to mix irregular 
47 
with regular battalions, volunteers 
with troops of the line, would ex. 
pose to certain destruction the ar- 
my where such an expedient was 
resorted to ; and that, consequently, 
the great object to which our at- 
tention should be directed for per- 
manent security against invasion, 
was the increase and improvement 
of our regular army. The supe- 
riority of an army over every spe- 
cies of irregular force being estas 
blished, the next question was, how 
were we to recruit that army, and 
augment it to the number necessary 
for defence. There were only two 
modes by which an army could be 
recruited ‘¢ force or choice.’ 
Force, Mr. Windham shewed, was 
peculiarly unfitted for ‘England, 
where its operation would be at 
once less efficacious and more op- 
pressive, than in countries subject 
to arbitrary government. But, 
force being excluded, choice, or vo- 
luntary enlistment, was the only 
means left us for procuring soldiers, 
aud we were then to consider, how 
it might be made effectual for that 
purpose. If we inquired why, of 
late years, this instrument had 
failed in England (for it used not 
formerly to be inefficacious) we 
should find that the military pro- 
fession in this country was not suf- 
ficiently rewarded, when compared 
with the other occupations open to 
the lower orders, and was, there- 
fore, considered by the body of the 
people as less eligible than other 
callings. The necessity for boun- 
ties to procure soldiers, shewed that 
the service of the army did not stand 
upon its true footing; for there 
was no other profession to which it 
was necessary to allure men by 
such means. Comparing govern- 
mans 
