134 
neral Lascy, Janded at Naples, and 
were quartered in that city and its 
neighbourhood. ‘The English, 
amounting to about 10,000, dis- 
embarked at Castell-a.mare, and 
were catitoned at that place, at 
Torre del Greco and in the vicini- 
ty. Sir James Craig was com- 
mander in chief of the English 
forces, and sir John Stuart second 
jn command. No sooner were the 
troops on shore, than preparations 
for active hostilities were begun by 
the government of Naples.  Le- 
vies of Neapolitans were ordered. 
Horses and waggons, necessary for 
the advance of the army, were pro- 
vided. Magazines were collected, 
and every demonstration was given 
by the court of Naples, that, if not 
consulted before the expedition was 
undertaken, the plan of operations, 
whatever it was, had now tts hearty 
approbation and support. 
It is impossiblein reviewing these 
transactions, not to be struck with 
the blindness of the Neapolitan go- 
vernment, as well as with the want 
ofany rational or intelligible ob- 
ject in the measures of the allies — 
For what purpose, we naturally 
ask, were troops landed at Naples? 
Were the English and Russians so 
ill-informed of what was passing in 
that kingdom, as not to know, that 
the French garrisons were already 
withdrawn from it? Is it true, as 
the Russians have asserted*, that 
this expedition was undertaken 
with the aim of producing a diver- 
sion in favour of the Austrians in 
Lombardy? But is it credible, that 
the authors of the expedition could 
seriously believe, that by landing an 
army at Naples, they would check 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 
1806. 
the operations of Massena on the - 
Adige? Was it not probable, that 
the fate of the campaign in Lom- 
bardy would be decided, before the 
allied army would advance from 
Naples to the Po, though it should 
experience no epposition or obsta- 
cle in its march? Jf the purpose of 
the expedition had been to serve 
the Austrians and promote the com- 
mon cause of the alliance, would 
not that object have been more ef- 
fectually accomplished by sending 
_troops to Venice, than by Janding- - 
them at Naples? Were the allies 
so intoxicated with dreams of suc- 
cess, when the court of Petersburg 
gave orders for this expedition, that 
it was thought necessary, thus early 
in the war, to take measures for 
securing to, Russia a preponderat- 
ing influence in the south of Italy? 
Was it not distrust in the modera. 
tion of Austria, should her armies 
prove successful in Lombardy, ra- 
ther than the project of assisting 
her, while contending for victory, 
that suggested this step to her asso. 
ciate? But, if the views of the allies 
are difficult of explanation, the 
conduct of the court of Naples 
could proceed only from the vio- 
tence and imprudence of passion. 
Naples was already freed from the 
burthen of supporting a French 
army. Ifthe allies were success. 
ful, she was secure from its return. 
Any assistance she could render the 
genera! cause, was so utterly insig- 
nificant, that if she had not been 
bound by treaty to be neutral, her 
inability to give any effectual aid to 
the allies, ought to have been a 
sufficient reason for their wishing 
her to remain so. But, while Na- 
_ ples 
* Note of the Russian minister (Tatischeft) to the marquis di Circello, Naples. June — 
6, 1806. 
