©. HISTORY. OF EUROPE. 
the lieut. governor, colonel Hotz, 
saw himself forced to capitulate. 
The surrender of Gaeta cut off the 
communication with the northern 
parts of the kingdom of Naples, 
where the spirit of disaffection was 
as strong as in the south; and set at 
liberty a force of 16,000 men, previ- 
ously employed in that siege, to act 
against the Calabrians. A decree 
was issued at Naples on the 3ist of 
July, declaring the two Calabrias in 
a state of war, and subjecting them 
to all the rigours of military law, 
Massena, invested with despotic 
authority, was placed at the head of 
a powerful army, and sent to reduce 
them to obedience. The insurgents 
were not in sufficient force to meet 
him in the ficld, and were too much 
divided among themselves, to attempt 
any enterprize of importance, even 
against his outposts. The difficulty 
of transporting artillery over the 
mountains retarded his operations ; 
but his progress, though slow, was un- 
jnterrupted, and his successes, though 
often dearly bought, were not 
checked by any reverse. On the 
16th ef August, the advanced 
guard of the French army entered 
Cosenza, the capital of upper Cala- 
-bria, and before the beginning of 
September they had recovered pos- 
session of the whole of that pro- 
vince, exccpting Amantea, Scalea, 
and some other places upon the 
coast. But it was some time before 
they penetrated in force into the 
jower Calabria. Their head-quarters, 
in December, were still at Cosenza 
and Fiume Freddo, in upper Cala. 
bria, though their advanced posts 
had long before been at Monteleone 
and Mileto, about 30 miles distant 
from Scylla, Cotrone did not fall 
Vou. XLVIII, 
145 
into their hands till the end of the 
year, nor Amantea, the hast place 
held by the insurgents upon the 
coast, till the beginning of the epsu- 
ing spring. 
The Calabrian insurgents or 
massé were composed of ‘the low- 
est, worst and most miserable 
of the country people and villa- 
gers. Attracted by pay or the 
hope of plunder to the standard 
under which they fouglit, no con- 
fidence could be reposed in their 
fidelity ; and though individually 
brave, when assembled in bodies no 
dependence could be placed on their 
steadiness. While the French were 
still at a distance, a report was 
brought to the massé in lower Cala- 
bria, that the enemy was advancing 
to attack them, on which the capi, 
or chiefs of the massé fled in the 
most shameful manner, and the 
massé, abandoned by their leaders, 
after recovering from their first 
panic, broke out in such acts of 
murder, cruelty and rapine, that it 
became necessary for sir John Stuart 
to cross over to Scylla, and send 
detachments of British troops into 
the interior of the country, to put a 
stop to their excesses.* Ona sub- 
sequent occasion, intelligence hay. 
ing been sent to the Neapolitan 
generals, that the French, who 
were lying at Nicastro to the num- 
ber of 4000 men, were afraid to 
cross the river Lamato, lest the Eng- 
lish should Jand and attack them in 
the rear, it was resolved to attempt 
to surprise them in that situation, 
by advancing from Monteleone 
and Filadelfia, with 1600 of the 
massé and 2000 Neapolitan troops ; 
but whea this corps had arrived 
within 4 miles of the enemy, a 
* This happened in the — part of August, 
