HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
might he wanted. The result of sir 
John Moore’s inquiries was unfa- 
vourable to any new expedition to 
the continent. Le found the popu- 
face of Naples discontented . and 
ready to attempt an insurrection, if 
encouraged by the. presence of a 
considerable British army; _but, 
without some prospect of coopera- 
tion from the upper part of Ltaly, 
he saw no advantage to be gained by 
encouraging these dispositions ; and 
with respect to the war in Cala- 
bria, he was satisfied that,.by sup- 
plying the peeple with arms and 
ammunition and exciting them to 
insurrection, we were merely orga- 
nising and keeping alive a predatory 
civil war, ruinous and destructive to 
individuals, while it was unattended 
with any real er permanent benefit 
to ourselyes or to our ally. ‘The 
information collected by generil 
Fox at Messina, and the conduct of 
the massé in Jower Calabria, coin- 
cided with the report of sir John 
Moore, and determined general Fox 
to make no expedition to the conti- 
nent, unless some more favourable 
opportunity presented itself, and in 
the mean time to withhold from the 
massé supplies of arms and ammu- 
nition, which they were obviously 
employing in other uses, than such 
as a British general could approve of. 
This determination was far from 
being acceptable at Palermo, where 
the court listened grecdily to every 
plan proposed to it for the recovery 
of Naples, and thought always the 
Jast project laid before it the surest 
to succeed. The marquis di Cir- 
cello, who had been appointed mi- 
Mister of foreign affairs on the re- 
signation of sir John Acton, was a 
person of very middling abilities, 
but high in favour with the queen, 
and implicitly devoted to her service. 
daz 
It was natural for such a minister, 
desirous of pleasing his govercign, 
and indifferent or blind to all other 
consequences, to propose to the 
commander of the British forces, to 
engage, in conjunction with the 
troops of his Sicilian majesty, in a 
combined attack upon Naples. A 
temporary possession of that city, he 
argued, though it were for twenty~ 
four hours only, if it did no other 
good, woyld at least enable their 
majesties to take vengeance on their 
rebellious subjects. Such a consi- 
deration was not calculated to dis- 
posea British officer in favour of their 
plan ; but there were other reasons, 
besides the disgust arising from the 
disclosure of such views, which de- 
termined general Fox to express, in 
the most. peremptory manner, his 
decided disapprobation of the pro- 
ject, and to signify that it was to- 
tally impossible for the British army 
to co-operate in such an expedition. 
The preseryation of Sicily from 
the French, the great object for 
which a British army was stationed 
in the Mediterrancan, was not to be 
hazarded for the uncertain. prospect 
of recovering the useless and preca- 
rious possession of Naples. The sea- 
son of the year was unfavourable for 
military operationsin Calabria, where 
it was proposed that the British 
army should act, while the Neapo- 
litan and Sicilian troops made an 
attack on Naples. The malaria of 
Calabria had been fatal to many 
officers and soldiers engaged in sir 
John ‘Stuart’s expedition; but if 
so pernicious at Midsummer, how 
much more destructive was its in- 
fluence likely to be in the end of 
autumn, the season when this new 
expedition was to be attempted. It 
was no exaggeration to calculate, 
that after a campaign of three 
L2 months 
