148: 
months in so unhealthy a climate, 
not one’ half of the army could be 
expected to be in a State fit for ser- 
vice. But, what was the object for 
which a British army was thus to 
be sacrificed, and the island of Si- 
cily deprived of the forces destined 
for its defence? Supposing the ex- 
pedition crowned with success and 
Naples recovered, was there any, 
the remotest possibility, in the pre- 
sent state of Europe, of the Neapo- 
litan troops being able to maintain 
their conquest? But, if the recovery 
of Naples was contemplated as a 
temporary occupation only, what 
could be intended by it but the 
gratification of revenge, by the de- 
struction and plunder of the city 
and massacre ofits inhabitants. But 
there was no chance of even this 
degree of success, unless from the 
effects of surprise and panic among 
the French ; and yet, (such in every 
view was the unpromising aspect of 
the affair,) it was certain that 
before the attempt could be made, 
the whole plan and details of the 
expedition would be known at Na- 
ples. For the court of Palermo 
was surrounded by French and 
Neapolitan emigrants, who found 
it easy, suth was the indiscretion 
of those entrusted with its se- 
crets, to penetrate into all its 
designs, which they as regularly 
communicated to the ministers of 
Joseph Bonaparte. But, unless the 
French were taken by surprise, and 
panic struck by an unexpected in- 
surrection at Naples, little was to 
be expected from Sicilian and Nea- 
politan troops acting against them. 
_ The Neapolitan and Sicilian soldiers 
were brave and capable of discipline, 
bet they were ill-oflicered, ill-ap- 
pointed, il! cloathed, ill paid, and 
from bad usage ill affected to their 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 
1806. 
government. It had been the fatal 
policy of sir John Acton to discou- 
rage Neapolitan and Sicilian gen- 
tlemen from engaging in the military 
service of thcir country, by a sys- 
tematic preference of foreigners to 
Natives in the army, without re- 
gard to character or merit, or to 
any other consideration, but that of 
not being a natural born subject of 
his Sicilian majesty. ‘The officers of 
the Neapolitan army were, there- 
fore, in general, foreigners, and 
many of them adventarers without 
education, taken from the lowest 
ranks and occupations of society. 
Such men, equally destitute of mi- 
litary talents and experience, as of 
birth, fortune, acquirements, or 
probity, brought the profession to 
which they belonged into discredit ; 
and were contemned for their mean. 
ness, and hated for their dishonest 
and fraudulent practices by their 
own soldiers. So little confidence 
wastobe placed in most of them, that 
when sir John Stuart had Sicilian 
troops acting under him in Calabria, 
a British commissary was employed 
to distribute their rations, as the 
only means of ensuring that the 
soldier received his allowance, and 
that it was not intercepted and de- 
tained by his officer. Nothing could 
exceed the aversion and contempt 
with which the subjects of his 
Sicilian majesty viewed the military 
service of their sovereign; but, 
though the corporal punishments 
used in the British army filled them 
with horror and disgust, as fit only 
for galley slaves, they were eager to 
engage in the English service, and 
proud of being treated and consi- 
dered as English soldiers. 
Thwarted in its plan of operations 
by the refusal of the English ge- 
neral to ca-operate in a project, 
every 
