HISTORY OF ‘EUROPE. 
-pewer that threatened the general 
‘safety, or endangered the individual 
members of the European common- 
wealth.— Germany was the only 
state that inspired at ence the ambi- 
tious with awe, and the weak with 
confidence. Placed in the centre of 
_the political world, the weight and 
Stability of its power, maintained an 
order and regularity in the sur- 
rounding system, which slight and 
_transitory causes could not disturb. 
‘But this security to the liberties of 
Europe, derived in some measure 
_from the very faults and imperfec- 
.tions of the Germanic constitution, 
_was sacrificed to the ambition, and 
destroyed by the rise of the house 
of Brandenburg. From the moment 
.that Germany was virtually divided 
into two separate states, with op- 
posite views, inclinations, and inte- 
fests, France was sure of an ally 
in the heart of the empire, Germany 
_was balanced by itself, and no ge- 
wieral or effectual combination could 
_be formed, to resist the only power 
from which the independence of 
Europe has been ever seriously in 
danger. 
The same political views which 
had led France to support the Pro- 
-testants of Germany against the am- 
Aition and bigotry of the emperors, 
‘induced her to favour the elevation, 
abet the usurpations of Prussia. 
She formed, it is true, at one time, a 
; “temporary connection with Austria*, 
_Rhich had nearly proved fatal to the 
russian monarchy; but that al- 
ce was the work of a court 
intrigue, and was condemned by her 
wisest statesmen, as no less contrary 
aie ber interest than it proved dero- 
ry to her glory. It required, 
Saeed i little Boren to shew that 
* In 
Dees 
1538 
Trance was gratuitously raising the 
most eflectual obstacle to her own 
ambition, when she concluded «a 
treaty, the efiect of which was to 
increase the power of the Austrian 
monarchy, and consolidate its au- 
thority over Germany. In Prussia 
she had an ally too weak to be a 
rival, too powerful to be a burthen, 
and too dependent on her protec- 
tion to become an enemy. For, if 
Prussia was useful to France, by 
keeping up a permanent division of 
interests in Germany, and prevent- 
ing its states and princes from ever 
uniting cordially in any common 
cause, it was still more necessary 
for Prussia to preserve the friend- 
ship, and obtain the protection of 
France. Such was her inferiority 
to Austria in real power and sub- 
stantial resources, that without an 
ally like France, she was unable te 
maintain her newly acquired rank 
and importance among the states of 
Europe ; nor could she be relieved 
from the necessity of this depen- 
dence, but by an increase of terri- 
tory and addition of subjects, which 
it was, therefore, the constant ob. 
ject of her policy to attain. 
The part which the king of Prus- 
sia took against France, in 1792, 
arose from a false persuasion that 
the revolution was unpopular in 
that kingdom, and that the re-esta- 
blishment of the ancient monarchy 
was necessary to restore the ancient 
power and influence of France in 
foreign countries. Undeceived in 
these particulars, and discovering in 
the conduct of his allies, their de- 
sign. to dismember France, and 
reduce her to a subordinate state, 
he abandoned their cause, and con- 
cluded at Basle a separate peace 
1756. 
with 
