HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
enemies of France, and that the war- 
like preparations of Prussia had 
arisen from a _ misunderstanding, 
which the emperor's late interesting 
conversations with himself and Luc- 
chesini, he had no doubt, would 
remove. On receiving these assu- 
rances, Bonaparte authorized his 
minister to declare,* that he should 
make no public declaration on the 
subject of his differences with Prus- 
sia, till the effect of Knobelsdorff’s 
report at Berlin was known.— 
A second communication from Tal- 
Jeyrand,+ complaining that the 
intelligence from Berlin wore every 
day a more hostile aspect, and 
expatiating on the natural ties 
between France and Prussia, war 
between which, he said, appeared 
tothe emperor a political monstrosi- 
ty, maintained for some time longer 
the appearance of a_ negotiation 
with a view to peace. But, in the 
mean while, the french troops were 
continually advanciag towards. the 
future scene of action, and on the 
24th of September Bonaparte left 
his capital to take the command ef 
his army, having three days before 
summoned the confederates of the 
Bhige to furnish their contingents. 
On the first of October the mask, 
which Prussia had so ineflectually 
worn, was at length Jaid aside. A 
note was presented by Knobelsdorff, 
demanding as a preliminary to ne- 
gotiation, that the whole of the 
French troops should instantly re- 
pass the Rhine; that no obstacle 
should be raised by France to the 
' formation of a northern confede- 
racy, including all the states not 
named in the fandamental act of 
the confederation of the Rhine; and 
that the basis of the negotiation 
* Sept. 13, 
t Sept. 18. 
169 
should be the separation of Wesel 
from the French empire, and the 
reoccupation of the three abbies by 
the Prussian troops. To these de- 
mands the French emperor did not 
even deign toanswer. But ‘Valley- 
rand, in a report on the causes of 
the war,t availed himself of them 
with great dexterity, to shew, with 
some degree of plausibility, if nat 
with perfect truth, that had Irance 
been willing to gratify the unjust 
ambition of Prussia at the expence 
of her weaker neighbours, the 
flames of war would not have been 
rekindled on the continent. Prus. 
sia had in truth been as perfidious, 
as unprincipled in her ambition as 
France; but she had coprducted 
herself with less ability and with 
less success. Her morality had 
been the same; but, after selling 
her honour and reputation, she had 
been defrauded of the price. 
It was a great error of his Prus- 
sian majesty, when he determined 
upon war with France, to continue 
the same persons in his government, 
who had directed his counsels during 
the whole of the late disgraceful 
proceedings. These persons~ had 
given abundant proofs of incapacity, 
in all the negotiations they had 
conducted; and such was their 
reputation, that they had no means 
of inspiring other governments with 
confidence in the sincerity of their 
professions, but by embarking their 
master, alone and unassisted, in a 
contest with Bonaparte. Whether 
it was from this conviction, or from 
a vain hope, in which they indalged 
to the last moment, of adjusting their 
differences with France, they were 
strangely remiss in communicating 
to other powers their intention to 
t Oct. 6. 
' go 
