ensued, in which, 
7 
HISTORY OF EUROPE. 175 
as M. Talley- 
rand observes, there is a cha- 
racter of openness and precision, 
that had not hitherto been seen in 
the communications between the two 
courts. The great difficulty con- 
sistedin the admission ef Russia in- 
to the negotiation. M. ‘Talleyrand 
endeavours with much ingenuity to 
represent that power as interposing 
its authority between two great na- 
tions fully competent to adjust their 
own differences, but Mr. Fox in- 
sists-on her being a party in the 
question, and an ally of Great Bri- 
tain, whose interests are insepara- 
biy connected with her own. To 
bring the discussion to a point, Mr. 
Fox: states explicitly,* that his ma- 
jesty was ‘willing to negotiate con-, 
jointly with Russia, but would not 
consent to negotiate separately. A 
month elapsed without any answer 
being given to this dispatch, and the 
first overture may be said to have 
failed in consequence of the deter- 
mination of England not to nego- 
tiate separately, and the unwilling-- 
ness of France to admit the inter- 
vention of Russia. But, though no 
arrangement took place, ‘* the 
spirit of conciliation manifested on 
both sides, was considered as a 
great advance to peace;’’+ and in 
the course of the month of May, 
the English cabinet were, no doubt, 
enabled to ascertain with greater 
' precision, the views and intentions 
of the court of St. Petersburg, and 
enabled to determine how far the 
substance and advantage of a joint 
Hegotiation might be preserved, 
without insisting on the forms, to 
* Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, April 20. 
t Id. to Id. April 8. 
which France seemed to feel sa. 
much repugpance. 
Whether M. Taliyrand calculated 
onthe probability of sich commu- 
nications between the two courts, 
or was only anxious to prolong a 
correspondence, which might ulti- . 
mately lead to a negotiation, he 
wrote aletter on the 2d of June, in 
the form of an answer to Mr. Fox’s 
dispatch of the 20th of April, in 
which, after some vague observae 
tions on the nature of alliances, 
and some trivial objections to a 
joint negotiation, he proposes,— 
‘¢ first, to negotiate in the same pre- 
liminary forms, which were adopt- 
ed during the administration of the 
marquis of Rockingham, in 1782; 
forms, which were not renewed _ 
with so much advantage in the ne- 
gotiations of Lisle, but which were 
perfectly successful in the negotia- 
tions which preceded the treaty of 
Amiens ;—secondly, to establish as 
a basis two fundamental principles ; 
the first, taken from Mr. Fox’s 
letter of the 26th of March, name- 
ly, ‘* That the two states should have 
for their object, that the peace be 
honourable for them and their re- 
spective allies, and at the same time, 
of a nature to secure, as far as it is 
in their power, the future tranquillity 
of Europe; the second principle 
to be an acknowledgment on the 
part of the two powers, of their 
mutual right of intervention and 
guaranty in coutivental, and in ma 
ritime affairs. t 
The English government does not 
seem to have returned any immedi- 
ate answer to this letter, Indeed, 
+ From M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox, June 2d. 
though 
