178 
the paper combined with those de- 
clarations, it is clear that three spe. 
cific ofiers were held out as induce- 
ments to Great Britain to treat, viz. 
the restoration of Hanover, the pos- 
session of Sicily as a consequence of 
the principle of the uti possidetis, 
and a facility in the arrangement of 
the form of treating, which, without 
establishing a congress er recogniz- 
ing the claim of a joint negotiation, 
would not impair the advantages 
which Great Britain and Russia 
might derive from their close con- 
nection and alliance. 
. The restoration of Hanover was 
considered as a point unconnected 
with the basis of the treaty. It was 
a compliment to the crown of Great 
Britain in return for the recognition 
virtual or stipulated, of the empe- 
ror of France, and of the nu- 
merous sovereignties conferred on 
various branches of his family 
since. the commencement of the 
war, Bonaparte had in all pro~ 
bability promised the electorate to 
the king of Prussia, if he had not 
actually guaranteed the possession 
of it to that monarch; but in or- 
der to retain the power of amusing 
the court of Berlin as long as he 
might find his interest to do so, he 
was naturally anxious to conceal 
this offer of sacrificing her supposed 
interests to the attainment of peace 
with Great Britain, Such indeed 
seems to have been-his motives in 
preferring a message through lord 
Yarmouth toa continuance of the 
correspondence between the mini- 
sters of the two countries. The 
occupation of Hanover by Prussia 
was in itself a reasonable plea, even 
to Great Britain, for not commit. 
ting the offer of its restoration to 
writing, till further progress had 
been made towards the conclusion 
: | 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1806. 
of peace. Many well informed 
persons have, notwithstanding 
these precautions, attributed the — 
war between I’rance and Prussia to 
the knowledge acquired by the lat. 
ter of this overture, The conduct 
of the Prussian cabinet, so empha. 
tically termed inconceivable by Bo- © 
-naparte, is in this instance much 
too unintelligible for us to unmask. 
Future historians may obtain do- — 
cuments to which we have no ac- 
cess. It will be for them to deter 
mine whether the promoters of the 
campaign of 1807, in addition to 
the other instances of their infatu- 
ation, had actually the strange pre- 
tension of punishing Bonaparte fer 
his sacrifices in favour of peace, and 
of avenging on France her predi- © 
liction of the rights of our sovereign 
at the expence of projects for the 
aggrandizement of Prussia. ‘The 
Frenchemperor must have been more ~ 
and more aware of the hostility of © 
Prussia in proportion as the negoti- 
ation advanced ; yet he never shewed 
any wish to conciliate her dispo. 
sitions or to recede from his offer of © 
restoring Hanover to its lawful se- 
vereign. 
On the other points of the nego= 
ciation his conduct was very differs 
ent. If, on the return of lord | 
Yarmouth, the outward appear-— 
ance of conciliation was preserved, 
the substance of the terms demand- 
ed was very unexpectedly altered, _ 
and the circumstanees of the two. 
countries openly maintained by 
M. Talleyrand to be materially’ 
changed in favour of France. The 
fact was, that the French had either 
ascertained that M. D’Oubril, the 
Russian minister, was secretly aue 
thorized to treat for a separate | 
peace, or foresaw, with their usual 
Sagacity, that the weakness of his 
3 
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