HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
character would enable them to in- 
timidate him into that fatal and in- 
considerate measure. M. Talley- 
rand, * therefore, predicted that 
the advantages of a joint ncgotia- 
tion were’ defeated, and openly 
insisted on that circumstance as a 
legitimate motive for extending his 
demands, If this view of the subject 
was not to be reconciled to high 
and chivalrous notions of honour, 
it must be acknowledged to be 
within the usual line of policy, 
which states prescribe to themselves; 
and, that to have disdained the 
advantage which France might 
have derived from this change of 
circumstances, would have been a 
rare instance of forbearance among 
the transactions between nation and 
nation. The French government, 
on the contrary, seem to have becn 
elated with the prospect of success 
likely to attend their negotiation 
with M, D’Oubril. They had not 
determined on the extent of the 
fresh demands to which this new 
State of things would, in their 
judgment, entitle them; and, M. 
Talleyrand, + in the first interview 
with lord Yarmouth, after his 
return to Paris, not only departed 
entirely from his ‘clear and explicit 
offer of Sicily, but indulged himself 
‘in vague allusions to further de. 
mands, and in peremptory repre- 
Sentations of the necessity of nego- 
_tiating with some person duly au- 
‘thorized and empowered to treat. 
‘This first deviation from the original 
_ Overtures was received by the Bri- 
tish ministry as the omen of the 
failure of negotiation. From that 
period Mr. Fox t is said to have 
despaired entirely of its success, 
* Papers, No. 14. 
179 
That great statesman, at all periods 
of his life, attached uncommon im. 
portance to the preponderance of 
power in the Mediterranean ; and 
it is probable that the value of the 
island alone would have rendered 
him less disposed to surrender 
Sicily than any European posses. 
sion, over which France had not 
hitherto acquired a control. But 
to the honourable mind of Mrs 
Fox there must have been a yet 
stronger objection to any cession of 
that country. Not only had Great 
Britain no right to cede it without 
the consent of his Sicilian majesty, 
but the court of Palermo, with all 
its vices and imperfections, had a 
claim on the gratitude and justice 
as weil as on the magnanimity of 
Great Britain and Russia. “The 
obligation, indeed, was stronger on 
the latter power, and, it is true, 
that at that period the Russian minis 
ster shewed little inclination to be 
bound by it. But the correspon- 
dence of Mr. Fox abundantly 
proves that even the instances of 
an ally, to whose wishes he was so 
anxious to defer, would, with dif. 
ficulty, have extorted from him any 
compliance with a measure of so 
doubtful a character. The value, 
therefore, of the possession itself, 
and the claims of the Sicilian court 
on the protection of the allies must 
have made such a demand on the 
patt of France at any time a mate- 
rial] obstacle to the progress of the 
negotiation. The circumstances in 
which it was made rendered it yet 
-more discouraging. The English ca- 
binet considered it not only unrea- 
sonable in itself but as a departure 
from the principles and basis of the 
+ Papers, No. 14. 
+ Lord Hollands Speech on the Slave Trade, 
Ne negociation, 
