182 
from London, or the English minis- 
ter in Russia had received any in-~ 
structions from his court. M. Tal- 
Jeyrand with* great apparent frank- 
ness informed the British nego~ 
tiator of this piece of intelligence, 
the day after its arrival in Paris, 
and assured him that France was 
now disposod to make peace with 
England on more favourable terms 
than she otherwise would have been 
induced to admit. ‘The probability 
of the ratification of M. D’Oubril’s 
treaty being refused, had been fore- 
seen, and lord Lauderdale was in. 
structed ‘* to + consider the two 
courts as having reverted to their 
former situation with additional 
bonds of union, resulting from fresh 
proofs of their respective adherence 
to the spirit and principles of their 
alliance.” As it was soon obvious, 
that the abandonment of Russia 
was to be the price of the more fa- 
vourable terms, so ostentatiously 
announced to Great Britain the 
honourable determination of our 
court not to listen to any such pro- 
jects, prevented any precise detail 
of the concessions J’rance was wil. 
ing to make for the attainment of 
her object. It is however worthy 
of remark, that no offer of Sicily 
‘was even in the supposition of a 
separate peace ever made during the 
course of the negotiation. Mr. 
Fox was now unable to discharge 
the duties of his office. The princi- 
ples, however, which he had lJaid 
down, seem to have regulated the 
conduct of the British cabinet 
throughout the discussions. Anat. 
tention not only to the interests but 
to the wishes of Russia, a firm de- 
termination to listen to no measure 
* Papers, (No. 46). 
~~, 
+ Papers, (No, 41). 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1806. 
that could give her umbrage or 
suspicion,and a strong desire to pre- 
serve Sicily, amounting nearly toa 
resolution not to abandon it, were 
on the part of Great Britain, the 
niost prominent features of the Jat. 
ter, as they had been of the early 
part of the negotiation. Lord Lau- 
derdale was not authorized ‘‘ to £ 
sign any treaty except provisionally, 
such treaty not to have its full 
effect until peace should be cons 
cluded between Russia and France 3” 
but he was at the same‘time in 
structed,§ ‘¢ to impart to the French 
plenipotentiaries, the conditions 
upon which Russia, (according to. 
the full and perfect knowledge his 
Britannic majesty had of the in. 
tentions of that court,) would be 
willing to negotiate with the 
French government; to reduce 
them into the form of a treaty in 
the event of their being agreed to on 
both sides ; and to insert an article 
in the provisional treaty between 
Great Britain, and France, by 
which his Britannic majesty should 
engage to employ his mediation for 
the purpose of obtaining the acces- 
sion of his majesty the emperor of 
all the Russias to the said treaty.’? 
It should seem that M. ‘Talleyrand 
felt || little or no objection to the 
above-described form of proceeding 5 
but notwithstanding the conciliating 
tone adopted by that minister, the 
official note in which the promised 
acquiescence of the emperor was sig+ ~ 
nified, breathed a very different 
spirit. It contained much irrelevant 
and offensive matter; it was con- — 
ceived in the language of remon- 
strance and reproach,-and @ barely — 
conveyed a reluctant consent to the 
{ Papers, (Enclosure A. in No. 49). _ 
$({bidem.) |] Papers, [No. 49, aud No. 50.] §f Papers, (Enclosure A, in No. 40): 
proposal 
