HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
proposal of lord Lauderdale. It is 
manifest from this circumstance, as 
well as from other passages of the 
correspondence, that the impatience 
of Bonaparte would have brought 
the negotiation to an abrupt and 
violent conclusion, but for the fre- 
quent and wise interposition of his 
ministers, who sometimes by address 
and sometimes by representation, 
contrived to soften the tone and 
moderate the language of their offi- 
cial communications. ‘The English 
negotiator in *his reply to theabove- 
mentioned paper, though he took 
as much notice of the offensive to. 
pics introduced into it, as was es- 
Sential to the maintenance of his 
own dignity, very judiciously com. 
bined it with the personal assurances 
of M. Talleyrand, and considered 
it as amounting to a full admission’ 
of his proposal. But on the renewal 
of the conferences it did not appear 
that France was disposed to relax in 
any one of her pretensions. In the 
mean while Bonaparte had left Paris 
for the army on the Rhine, and one 
of the plenipotentiaries(gen.Clarke, } 
as well as M, Talleyratid accom. 
companied him on his journey. M. 
Champaguy, who remained to con- 
duct the negotiation, was neither 
authorized to +relinquish the claims 
of Joseph upon Sicily, nor to ac- 
quiesce in tsuch an arrangement as 
would have satisfied the court of St. 
Petersburgh. The negotiation was 
_ therefore at an end, and lord Lau- 
derdale peremptorily insisted on his 
passports. In the last conference 
M. Champagny, though he had 
Previously doubted his paqwers of 
hearing lord Lauderdale upon the 
Subject of Russia (notwithstanding 
183 
the assurance’ contained in $the pubs 
lic note and §conversations of M. 
Talleyrand) offered || to cede the 
full sovereignty of Corfu to that 
power. ‘This was rejected as in- 
sufficient, which has led to the erro-~ 
neous opinion that the negotiation 
was broken off solely because Great 
Britain insisted on the cession of 
Dalmatia to Russia. 
It appears, however, that even if 
Great Britain, departing from the 
principles which had guided Mr. 
Fox in the commencement of the 
negotiation, had considered her own 
views of the interest of Russia rae 
ther than the wishes of thatcourt, im 
a treaty provisionally signed for her 
approbation, yetit would have been 
impossible, in the shape in which it 
was proposed, to acquiesce in the 
relinguishment of Dalmatia, without 
incurring the risk of forfeiting the 
confidence of Russia, and neither 
accomplishing a general, nor evena 
separate peace after all. Had the 
English ministers completed the part 
of the treaty relating to Russia with. 
out securing to that power the ob- 
ject of which she was most desirous, 
the French, by insisting on stipula- 
tions, which England considered as. 
utterly inadmissible, but to which 
Russia was comparatively inditfer- 
ent, would have thrown upon them 
the imputation of sacrificing the in- 
terests of their ally. his was the 
more to be apprehended, because on 
points of that description, especially 
Sicily, the French had shewn no dis- 
position whatever to relax, The con- 
sequence would have been, that the 
strength of the alliance between the 
twocourts would have been broken, 
The feeling of a common cause 
* Papers, (Enclosure B, in No. 50.) | + Papers, (No. 51.) } Papers, (No. 52.) 
Papers, (No. 49, No, 50, and Enclosure A, in i 50.) 
4 
|| Papers, (No. 52.) 
woul 
