188 
to the greatest military genius of 
this or of any other age. But, ex- 
ceptionable as ‘was the~ plan of a 
military council to direct the ope- 
rations of the war, it may be ques- 
tioned, whether it was not exposed 
to fewer objections than the ap- 
pointment of such a commander as 
the duke of Brunswick to be gene- 
ralissimo of the army. - A more 
unfortunate choice for that import- 
ant situation it was impossible to 
have made. The duke of Bruns- 
wick had distinguished himself, in 
early youth, under his uncle prince 
Ferdinand, as an active, successful 
partizan ; and had afterwards gain- 
ed a high reputation in ‘courts, by 
the prosperous issue of his expedi- 
tion against the Dutch patriots in 
IJolland; but that reputation, 
which among military men had been 
always somewhat equivocal, he had 
subsequently forfeited by his mis- 
carriages in France; and on no 
occasion had he ever displayed the 
talents of a great general, or shewn 
a mind sufliciently capacious and 
comprchensive to direct the move- 
ments of a great army. A well. 
disposed sovereign and well-bred 
courticr, he was neither a good 
general nor a great man. Elevated 
to his present high command, not 
by the opinion of his merit, or the 
recollection of his services, but by 
his skill and management of in- 
trigue, it was soon evident, that the 
narrowness of his mind was unequal 
to the magnitude of a situation, 
which he had ambition to covet, 
but wanted ability to fill. Wrapped 
up in mystery and concealment, 
he had little intercourse with offi- 
cers of’ merit, and admitted no 
general but Mollendorf to his coun. 
cils of war, where he discussed 
military plans with the king, Haug~ 
ANNUAL REGISTER, 1806. 
witz and Lucchesini. Immersed in 
detafls, he bestowed on_ inferior 
concerns the time, which should 
have been occupied with business of. 
importance; and yet so deficient 
was he in method and arrange- 
ment, that the sole result of his la« 
bours was confusion and discon. — 
tent. Unable to form and combine — 
a well digested system of operations — 
for the conduct of the campaign, — 
his perplexed and contradictory — 
orders, the irregular marches and 
counter-marches of his troops, 
shewed too plainly, that he pursued © 
no steady plan, nor had any well. 
defined object in view. Disconcert- 
ed and alarmed by every movement — 
of the French, it was manifest, that 
he had not penetrated the designs — 
of the enemy, nor provided against 
their success. So obvious was his 
incapacity, that his army quickly 
perceived his unfitness to command ~ 
them, and Jost all confidence in — 
their general. 
Early in October the Prussian 
head-quarters were at Naumburg, 
where also their principal magazines 
were collected, and their army ex~_ 
tended itself in the country border. 
ing on the Saale in Upper Saxony. 
On the 4th of that month their” 
head-quarters were moved forward — 
to Erfurt, and on the 10th to 
Weimar. The position of their 
army was nearly as follows. 
Their left, commanded by prince 
Hohenlohe, under whom were 
general Tauenzein and _ prince 
Lewis of Prussia, occupied Saal- 
feld, Schleitz, and Hof, and its 
advanced posts extended to 
Munchberg and Culmbach. Their 
centre, commanded by the duke 
of Brunswick, marshal Mollen- 
dorf, and the king in person, 
was distributed in the neighbour- 
nots 
