HISTORY OF EUROPE. 
hood of Erfurt, Weimar, Gotha, 
and Eisenach, and its vanguard 
under the duke of Saxe Weimar, 
was stationed at Mecinungen on 
the Werra. Their right com- 
manded by general Ruchel exten- 
ded to Mulhavsen. [From _ this 
disposition of the Prussian army 
it is probable, that had not the 
duke of Brunswick been anti- 
cipated by the French, it was 
his intention to have begun hos- 
tilities by bearing down with his 
right on. Frankfort, with his 
centre on Wurtzberg, and with 
his left on Bamberg. A_ sepa- 
rate corps under general Blucher 
which had been stationed at 
Gottingen, for the protection of 
Westphalia, joined the main ar- 
my before the battle. Hesse was 
neutral, but the Saxons acted as 
auxiliaries to the Prussians, and 
served in the left under prince 
Hohenlohe. The reserve of the 
Prussian army under prince Eugene 
of Wirtemberg, did not arrive from 
Custrin till after the battle of Ayer- 
‘stadt. ‘The whole force, Prussians 
and Saxons, under the command of 
the duke of Brunswick, did not 
amount to less than 150,000 men. 
While this immense army remain- 
ed inactive on the banks of the 
Saale, the French were collecting 
_ their scattered troops and concen- 
trating their forces in the neighbour- 
hood of Bamberg. On the 6th of 
October Bonaparte arrived in that 
city, and on the sth the French 
army was in motion to attack the 
Prussians. Why the French were 
suffered peaceably to assemble their 
forces, without any movement of 
| the Prussians to attack them before 
the divisions of their army had 
formed a junction, it seems difficult 
to explain. If offensive operations 
188 
did not enter into the plan of the 
campaign, why did Prussia hurry on 
the war so unnecessarily ; why ad- 
vance beyond her fronticrs, to meet 
an enemy, whom she had determined 
not to attack? was it to get the 
start of Bonaparte in Saxony, and 
prevent its elector from acting to- 
wards her the part, which the 
elector of Bavaria had done last 
year towards Austria? but, had 
that been her motive, would 
Prussia have consented to the neu- 
trality of Hesse, for no better 
reason than to indulge the avarice 
of the elector, who hoped to obtain 
from England, by:an affected back. 
wardness in the war, a larger sub- 
sidy for his assistance? And, after 
all; what were the Saxons and 
Hessians in comparison of the Rus- 
sians, from whom every step taken 
by the Prussians in Thuringia was 
removing them toa greater distance? 
If the Prussians were too weak to 
attack the French, before the 
armies of the latter had united, 
they were still less able to resist 
them after their junction; and in 
that case nothing remained for the 
weaker party, but to fall back on 
the allies, who were coming up to 
its aid. 
The position of the Prussian 
army in front) was strong and 
perhaps impregnable. But a wise 
general, attentive to every danger 
to which his troops are exposed, 
should have refiected on the possi- 
bility of the enemy turning their 
flank: getting possession of their 
magazines: shutting them up in a 
country without resources; and 
forcing them to fight at a disadvan. 
tage, and, if worsted, without a 
possibility ef escape. The maga. 
zines at Hof, Zwickau, Weissen. 
fels, and Naumburg were left with- 
out 
