STATE PAPERS. 
peror then was. Scarcely had this 
minister been there a few days, 
when the whole face of affairs was 
changed; the misfortunes experi- 
enced by the court of Vienna 
had compelled it to sign av armi- 
stice, which was immediately fol- 
lowed by a peace. The emperor of 
Russia sacrificed his magnanimous 
views to the wish of his ally, and 
his troops returned home. Prussia 
stood now alone on the field of con- 
test. His majesty was obliged to 
limit his policy by his powers ; and 
instead, as had been his wish, of 
embracing the interests of all Eu- 
rope, make his own security and 
that of his neighbours, his first 
object. 
The French emperor proposed to 
count Haugwitz a treaty in which 
was stipulated, on the one side, 
a mutual guarantee of possessions, 
the inviolability of the Turkish ter- 
ritory, and the results of the peace 
of Presburg ; and, on the other, the 
taking possession of Hanover by 
Prussia, in return for the cession of 
three provinces. 
The first part of the treaty pro- 
mised, ‘at least for the future, an 
acknowledged, guaranteed, and, if 
Napoleon had so pleased, a firm, 
political constitution. The results 
of the peace of Presburg were a ge- 
neral misfortune for Europe, but 
_ Prussia sacrificed herself alone when 
she accepted them; and to place a 
- limit to the incessant usurpations of 
France, should the treaty be consi- 
dered by the court of St. Cloud as 
anything-more than words, appeared 
an advantage: the king, therefore, 
‘ratified this article unconditionally. 
The second half of the treaty of 
Vienna related to an object, the im- 
portance of which had been mani- 
fested by serious experience: Prus- 
80€ 
sia cold not rely on security for 4 
moment, so long as Hanover re- 
mained involved in a war, in which 
that country had, in fact, no con- 
cern. At whatever price it might 
be purchased, Prussia was resolved 
that the French should not return 
thither. She had her ¢hoice to ob- 
tain this end, either by a treaty or 
a war, The cession of three pro- 
vinces, which had been faithful and 
happy for a long series of years, 
was a sacrifice not to be made for 
any plan of vain ambition: but 
these provinces, in case of a war, 
would have been the first sufferers ; 
all the calamities of that war would 
have pressed upon the monarchy 
while the acquisition of Hanover, 
could it have been made under less 
unhappy circumstances, would have 
been productive of the most valuable 
advantages to Prussia. The king, 
therefore, conceived, that he recon< 
ciled his wishes with his principles, 
when he accepted the proposed ex. 
change, only under the condition, 
that the fulfilmentof the same should 
be deferred till the general peace, 
and that the consent of his majesty 
the king of Great Britain should be 
obtained. 
All the advantages of this treaty 
were for France. On the one side, 
she received guarantees, which put 
the seal on her conquests; on the 
other, she gave what she did not 
possess, what might be again cons 
quered by the chances of an uncer- 
tain war, while in the cessions of 
Prussia she found the means of en- 
riching her allies. 
But between a policy which will 
do every thing in its power, and an 
integrity which regards its duties, 
and especially its promises, the cone 
test is ever unequal. ‘The king aps 
proached the moment when he was 
BF 2 corvinced 
