184] ANNUAL REGISTER, 1812. 



ciding in opposition to the ambi- 

 tious projects of the French ruler. 

 A treaty of peace and annity was 

 ratified on August 1st, by which 

 the fornaer relations of friendship 

 and commerce between the two 

 countries were re-established, and 

 an alliance defensive against all 

 powers who, in resentment of 

 this treaty, should attack either 

 of the contracting parties, was 

 agreed upon. The assistance given 

 by the English fleet in the de- 

 fence of Riga, and the confidence 

 with which Russia intrusted its 

 whole naval force to winter in the 

 English ports, have already been 

 mentioned as consequences of this 

 renewed friendship. 



Whatever fluctuation there might 

 have been in the Russian councds 

 at the remote prospect of a contest 

 with the most formidable power 

 that Europe had ever beheld, there 

 was no symptom of indecision as 

 the storm rolled nearer ; and the 

 conditions which the court of 

 Petersburgh proposed as the price 

 of a continuation of its amity in- 

 dicated a firm resolution to main- 

 tain the independence becoming a 

 great and powerful empire. Alex- 

 ander had taken post at Wilna in 

 order to be at hand for assisting in 

 the deliberations respecting peace 

 and war. When the attack upon 

 his troops at Kowno, and the ad- 

 dress of Napoleon to his army, 

 had decided the point of hostility, 

 he issued, on June 25th, general 

 orders to his armies, declaring the 

 war to be commenced, and ex- 

 pressing confidence in the bravery 

 of his troops, and the justice of 

 his cause. The plan of the cam- 

 paign was wisely framed on the 

 defensive system, avoiding as long 

 as possible a general action with a 



foe so much superior in number* 

 and appointment, and whose im- 

 petuosity and military skill would 

 doubtless render his first onset 

 almost irresistible. Alexander him- 

 self, when compelled to leave Wil- 

 na, prudently returned to Peters- 

 burgh, aware that the presence of 

 the sovereign, when not profes- 

 sionally qualified for military com- 

 mand (which he can very rarely 

 be), is only an impediment to the 

 operations of his generals. The 

 disasters occasioned by the first 

 rush of this dreadful torrent were 

 met with a resolution and magnani- 

 mity on the part of the Russian 

 government ; and even after the 

 loss and destruction of the ancient 

 capital, not the most distant idea 

 seems to have been admitted of 

 yielding to the will of the invader. 

 Nor, in a war like this, would it be 

 just to attribute to a want of feeling 

 for the severe sufferings of its sub- 

 jects, this pertinacity of resistance ; 

 it was not a war for the attainment 

 of an object of ambition, in which 

 the happiness of the people had 

 little or no concern, but for that 

 national independence, without 

 which there can be neither public 

 honour nor private prosperity. 

 Further, it became evident, after 

 the battle of Borodino, that the 

 plan adopted was almost certain of 

 final success. The assailants were 

 continually diminishing in number 

 and strength ; while the reinforce- 

 ments of the defenders were con- 

 centrating on all sides, and their 

 confidence rose in proportion as 

 that of their enemies subsided. 

 The sure aid of their terrible winter 

 was also approaching ; and even 

 had the houses of Moscow been 

 left standing, no prudent general 

 would have thought of wintering 



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