222 



ANNUAL REGISTER, 1812. 



difficulties however, which each 

 had to encounter on its march 

 were such, that it was impossible 

 for them to reach their respective 

 points before day-break ; I judged 

 it best, therefore, as there was no 

 longer a possibility of surprise, to 

 defer the attack until we should 

 be better acquainted with the na- 

 ture and position of the works ; 

 and the troops bivouacked on the 

 Leina. 



I determined on endeavouring 

 to penetrate to the bridge by the 

 mountain path leading through the 

 village of Komangordo, although, 

 by that means, 1 should be de- 

 prived of the use of my artillery. 



On the evening of the 18th, I 

 moved with Major-General How- 

 ard's brigade, and the 6th Portu- 

 guese regiment, for the operation 

 provided with scaling ladders, &c. 

 Although the distance marched did 

 not exceed five or six miles, the 

 difficulties of the road were such, 

 that with the united exertions of 

 officers and men, the column could 

 not be formed for the attack before 

 daylight. Confiding, however, in 

 the valour of the troops, I ordered 

 the immediate assault of Fort Na- 

 poleon, My confidence was fully 

 justified by the event. 



The 1st battalion of the 50th, 

 and one wing of the 71st regi- 

 ment, regardless of the enemy's ar- 

 tillery and musketry, escaladed the 

 work in three places, nearly- at the 

 same time. The enemy seemed at 

 first determined, and his fire was 

 destructive; but the ardour of our 

 troops was irresistible, and the 

 garrison was driven at the point of 

 the bayonet, through the several 

 entrenchments of the tete-du-pont, 

 across the bridge, which having 

 been cut by those on the oppo&ite 



side of the river, many leaped 

 into the river, and thus perished. 



The impression made upon the 

 enemy's troops was such, that the 

 panic soon communicated itself to 

 those on the right bank of the 

 river, and Fort Ragusa was in- 

 stantly abandoned, the garrison 

 flying in the greatest confusion to- 

 wards Naval Moral. 



I cannot sufficiently praise the 

 conduct of the 50th and 71st regi- 

 ments, to whom the assault fell. 

 The cool and steady manner in 

 which they formed and advanced, 

 and the intrepidity with which 

 they mounted the ladders, and 

 carried the place, was worthy of 

 those distinguished corps, and the 

 officers who led them. 



Could the attack have been made 

 before day, the 92nd regiment, un- 

 der Lieutenant-Colonel Cameron, 

 and the remainder of the 71st 

 regiment, under the Hon. Lieut.- 

 Col. Cadogan, were to have esca- 

 laded the tete-du-pont, and effect- 

 ed the destruction of the bridge, 

 at the same time that the attack 

 was made on Fort Napoleon. The 

 impossibilitj' of advancing deprived 

 them of this opportunity of dis- 

 tinguishing themselves ; but the 

 share which they had in the opera- 

 tion, and the zeal which they dis- 

 played, entitles them to my warm- 

 est commendation; and I cannot 

 avoid to mention the steadiness 

 and good discipline of the 6th 

 Portuguese infantry, and two com- 

 panies of the 60tl) regiment, under 

 Colonel Ashvvorth, which formed 

 the reserve to this attack. 



Our operations in this quarter 

 were much favoured by a diversion 

 made by Lieut.-General Chowne, 

 with the troops under his orders, 

 against the castle of Mirabete, 



which 



