HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



the enemy, and the real state of 

 the country that was about to be- 

 come the theatre of hostilities. 

 We find Sir John Moore writing 

 to Lord Castlereagh, from Sala- 

 manca, 24th of November, 1808, 

 as follows : " The information, of 

 which your lordship must already 

 be in possession, renders it, per- 

 haps, less necessary for me to 

 dwell upon the state of aftairs in 

 Spain, so different from that which 

 was to be expected from the re- 

 ports of the oflScers employed at 

 the head-quarters of the different 

 Spanish armies. They seem all 

 of them to have been most miser- 

 ably deceived ; for until lately, 

 and since the arrival of Mr. 

 Stuart and Lord William Bentinck 

 at Madrid, and of Colonel Gra- 

 ham at the central army, no just 

 representation seems ever to have 

 been transmitted. Had the real 

 strength and composition of the 

 Spanish armies been known, the 

 defenceless state of the country, 

 and the character of the central 

 government, I conceive that Ca- 

 diz, not Corunna, would have been 

 chosen for the disembarkation of 

 the troops from England; and that 

 Seville, or Cordova, not Salaman- 

 ca, would have been selected as 

 the proper place for the assem- 

 bling of this army. The Spanish 

 government do not seem ever to 

 have contemplated the possibility 

 of a second attack, and are certainly 

 quite unprepared to meet that 

 which is now made upon them. 

 Their armies are inferior to the 

 French even in numbers. — In the 

 provinces no armed force what- 

 ever exists, either for immediate 

 protection, or to reinforce the 

 armies — The enthusiasm of which 

 we have heard so much no where 



appears. Whatever goodwill there 

 is (and I believe among the lower 

 orders there is a great deal) is 

 taken no advantage of." These 

 opinions, expressed not long after 

 Sir John had entered Spain, he 

 did not find any reason to retract 

 afterwards: as will fully appear 

 from the following narrative: 



After the most important events 

 in the peninsula, of the summer 

 of 1808, namely, the surrender of 

 Dupont, the flight of Joseph Buo- 

 naparte from Madrid, and the con- 

 vention of Cintra, the French 

 army retired from Madrid, and 

 repassed the Ebro. Their force 

 in this direction consisted of 

 about 50,000 men, concentrat- 

 ed in Navarre and Biscay. They 

 had besides, garrisons in Barcelo- 

 na, Figueras, and other fortresses, 

 amounting to above 15,000 more. 

 In these positions they quietly wait- 

 ed for reinforcements which were 

 on their march, as was announced 

 from time to time by every foreign 

 journal. By the 1st of November, 

 the French Army on the Ebro 

 was reinforced to the amount of 

 113,000 men. The Spaniards 

 never had, at one time, more than 

 60, or 70,000 in arms. It was 

 evident that the Spaniards must 

 be defeated. Yet the probability, 

 or even the possibility of this did 

 not seem to enter at all into the 

 contemplation of the British mi- 

 nister for the war department, 

 when he gave orders that the dif- 

 ferent corps of British troops should 

 form a junction at Burgos. 



While the French rested in their 

 cantonments behind the Ebro, ex- 

 pecting reinforcements and survey- 

 ing at their ease the unconnected 

 movements of the Spaniards, the 

 Spanish and English newspapers 



B 2 were 



