ANNUAL REGISTER, 1809. 



acquired just notions of Spanish 

 affairs ; for he was in close corre- 

 spondence with men of candour 

 and discernment, who resided on 

 the spot. Little was written by 

 them of Spanish ardour and en- 

 thusiasm. Their letters, on the 

 contrary, were filled with details 

 of the weakness and tardiness of 

 the Spanish Junta. 



This assembly consisted of thir- 

 ty-two persons, with equal powers. 

 They were divided into four sec- 

 tions, or, as we would say in Eng- 

 land, committees: one for the ad- 

 ministration of the interior; a se- 

 cond for that of justice; a third 

 for war ; and a fourth for the ma- 

 rine. Their councils were dis- 

 tracted by self-interest, mutual 

 jealousies, and discords. On the 

 whole, they seemed to be less 

 afraid of any foreign enemy, than 

 of internal riots and revolution, 

 which they set themselves by all 

 means to obviate, and particularly 

 by suppressing the liberty of the 

 press. Thus they damped and 

 chilled the spirits of the nation. 

 Judging of what Buonaparte could 

 do by what Spaniards were capa- 

 ble of, they thought it almost im- 

 possible for his army to traverse 

 the Pyrenees in winter. Should 

 the French have the temerity to 

 effect such a passage, they would 

 soon, it was believed, be famish- 

 ed. These notions were applica- 

 ble to the resources formerly pos- 

 sessed by France. But the mag- 

 nitude of the military preparations 

 of their present enem}', and the 

 celerity of his movements, con- 

 founded all their calculations. 



Sir John Moore by the close 

 correspondence he carried on with 

 Lord W. Bentinck, Mr. Stuart, 

 Colonel Graliam, and others, gra- 



dually penetrated the disguises in 

 which the Spanish government en- 

 veloped their affairs. A judicious 

 plan of a campaign can be formed 

 only by reflecting on the actual 

 state of things, and must neces- 

 sarily be hollow, and pregnant 

 with calamity, if founded on false 

 intelligence; yet the Spanish Jun- 

 tas exerted all their finesse to de- 

 ceive, not their enemy, but their 

 ally ; and they succeeded so per- 

 fectly, as to lead them to execute 

 a plan adapted to a state of things 

 the reverse of their real condition. 

 Their ardent proclamations, exag- 

 gerated numbers, invented victo- 

 ries, and vaunted enthusiasm, 

 could not deceive him whom it 

 would have been useful to deceive. 

 Buonaparte found ample means of 

 obtainingexact information. There 

 were traitors even among the pa- 

 triots loudest in the cause of their 

 country, who enabled him to cal- 

 culate, with perfect accuracy, the 

 precise portion of patriotism scat- 

 tered throughout the kingdom of 



Spain. Yet there are some 



facts, as Moore observes, that 

 would almost lead one to suspect, 

 that the Spanish Juntas, from an 

 excess of presumption and igno- 

 rance, and a heated imagination, 

 were so blinded, as to have mis- 

 led the British cabinet uninten- 

 tionally. For it is a well known 

 fact, that, at first, they considered 

 Spain as more than a match for 

 France. They applied to us for 

 arms and money only ; believing 

 they could raise more soldiers than 

 they required. How long they 

 continued in this infatuation is un- 

 certain ; but they appear to have 

 acquiesced in the offer of British 

 auxiliaries on the 26th of Sep- 

 tembei-. 



On 



