HISTORY OF EUROPE. 



of his country, in abandoning the 

 Spaniards without a struggle. The 

 pressing instances of Mr. Frere, 

 deprecating, in the name of the 

 Junta, all retreat upon Portugal, 

 and that minister's misstatements as 

 to the amount of the French force 

 in the neighbourhood of Madrid, 

 (whom he calculated at no more 

 than 11,000 men) determined him 

 to leave no possibility untried, in 

 a case where a concurrence of ad- 

 verse circumstances left nothing 

 but possibilities to build on. By 

 taking a line of positions on the 

 Duero, new exertions might be 

 awakened in the yet unsubdued 

 provinces of the South, time would 

 be afforded to call the dormant 

 energies of the people into action, 

 and to give reality and substance 

 to the boasted, but yet unembo- 

 died levies of the Junta. 



A new disaster frustrated this 

 plan also. On the 28th of No- 

 vember Sir John Moore received 

 intelligence from Mr. Stuart at 

 Madrid of the total defeat of 

 General Castanos at Tudela, on 

 the 22nd.* The question with the 

 British army was no longer how it 

 might serve the Spaniards, but 

 how provide for its own safety. It 

 was whether 29,000 British troops 

 should be opposed to the undi- 

 vided attack of 100,000 French, 

 or whether by retiring upon their 

 resources at Lisbon, they should 

 preserve themselves for more for- 

 tunate times. Sir John Moore 

 was not a moment undecided. He 



wrote 



" We must here take occasion to correct an error in our account of the impor- 

 tant battle of Tudela, Vol. L. Hist, of Eur. p. 239. The number of the Spa- 

 niards did not amount to half the number of troops, on the calculations and reports 

 of the Spaniards themselves there stated. Neither was General Castanos the 

 gcncralUsimo of one anny divided into three parts, and acting in concert, under the 

 direction of one head. Blake, I'alafox, and Castanos, were independent of each 

 other. 



mediately dangerous. The French 

 patroles had pushed forward as far 

 as Benevento. Sir David was at 

 Astorga ; and should the French 

 follow up their successes by ad- 

 vancing through the Asturias, his 

 rear might be endangered by the 

 roads either of Montoredo or Lu- 

 go. The Marquis of Romana, 

 (after the defeat of Blake, ap- 

 pointed captain-general of the 

 Spanish armies) was indeed en- 

 deavouring to collect his scattered 

 fugitives at Leon. But such as- 

 sistance ccxuld not induce Sir Da- 

 vid Baird to hazard an advance 

 towards Salamanca, at a time when 

 a retreat upon Portugal seemed 

 the only measure left for the por- 

 tion of the army then posted at 

 that place. Sir David Baird, re- 

 lying on intelligence received from 

 General Blake, that the French 

 were advancing in force from Rio 

 Seco, had already determined on 

 a retreat to Corunna, when Sir 

 John Moore undeceived him in 

 that particular, and sent him or- 

 ders immediately to efiect his junc- 

 tion. 



The British commander seems 

 to have been influenced on this 

 occasion, partly by the accounts 

 he had received of the march of 

 the French towards Castanos ; a 

 movement which delivered him 

 from all apprehensions for the im- 

 mediate safety of his own army ; 

 but more especially by the extreme 

 repugnance he had always felt to 

 the idea of disappointing the hopes 



